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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY MAY DENY APPRISAL AND CONFRONTATION IN
PURELY INVESTIGATIVE PROCEEDING
The Civil Rights Commission scheduled a hearing in Louisiana
to investigate alleged instances of discriminatory denial of Negro
voting rights,' which if willfully done could be the basis of criminal
prosecution of officials under both federal and state law.2 Certain
voting registrars were subpoenaed to appear and produce records
at the hearing. The registrars requested the names of their accusers
and assurance that the rights of apprisal, confrontation, and crossexamination would be granted. The Commission, relying on its
rules of procedure, 3 refused these requests. The registrars then
challenged the constitutionality of a hearing conducted under these
rules. A special three-judge federal court enjoined the hearing,
holding that rules denying witnesses the rights of apprisal, confrontation, and cross-examination had not been authorized by the
Civil Rights Act of 1957 and were, therefore, ultra vires. 4 On certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, held, reversed.
The Civil Rights Act authorizes rules which deny apprisal, confrontation, and cross-examination, and such denial is not a violation of
due process when an administrative agency is conducting an investigation even though facts may be discovered which could be the
basis of criminal charges against a witness. Hannah v. Larche, 363
U. S.420 (1960).
When the constitutionality of an administrative agency's procedure
has been challenged, the courts must first decide if the procedure has
been authorized by the statute or executive order under which
the agency purports to act. 5 The recent case of Greene v. McElroy
indicated that for a questionable procedure to be authorized it must
1. The Commission was created by the Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat.
634, 42 U.S.C. § 1975 (1958) and empowered to "investigate allegations in
writing under oath or affirmation that certain citizens of the United States
are being deprived of their right to vote and have that vote counted by
reason of their color, race, religion, or national origin; which writing, under
oath or affirmation, shall set forth the facts upon which such belief or be-

liefs are based." 71 Stat. 634, 42 U.S.C. § 1975 c(a) (1) (1958).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1958); LA. Rav. STAT. § 14:134 (1950).

3. The Civil Rights Act prescribes certain procedural requirements for
the Commission. 71 Stat. 634, 42 U.S.C. § 1975 (1958).
4. 177 F. Supp. 816 (1959).
5. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535
(1959); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178 (1957); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
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appear that "the President or Congress . . . specifically has decided
that the imposed procedures are necessary and warranted . . ."0 If

authorization is found, the problem becomes the adaptation of the
traditional rules of fair play embodied in the concept of due process
to the multiple and hybrid functions which agencies perform. This
problem has been dealt with largely by a process of classifying the
function of the agency as either adjudicative, legislative, or investigative. Thus, if an agency purports to determine a substantial
legal right of an individual in opposition to the interests of government or of another individual, the function is characterized as adjudicative, and the requirements of due process evolved for the
courts are used as guidelines to determine the limitations of agency
procedure. 7 Individuals affected by an adjudicative action must be
given a "fair hearing" which may generally be characterized as a
"trial-like" proceeding. While all the procedural rules applicable
to a court need not be observed, certainly, where the agency's
decision depends upon the truth of facts alleged about an individual,
that individual must be apprised of these facts and given an opportunity to employ counsel, confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and submit rebutting evidence.8 Such procedural rules have
been codified for most federal agencies in the Administrative Procedures Act. 9
When an agency acts in a legislative or executive capacity by
promulgating regulations determining the present or future rights
of everyone or a sizable group of persons, its function is labeled
"rule-making." In "rule-making," as in comparable congressional
activity, the public interest in the efficient determination of policy
outweighs the possible adverse effects on private interests to such
an extent that the individual is given relatively few rights to enable
6. 360 U.S. 474, 507 (1959). In the Greene case, an engineer employed by
a company engaged in military projects was denied a security clearance because of alleged Communist sympathies and associations. As a result of
the government action, he lost his job and could not find similar employment.
In the hearings which denied him his clearance, Greene was never informed
who his accusers were or given an opportunity to cross-examine them. The
Supreme Court held that the Executive Order establishing in general outline the security program which had taken away Greene's clearance had
not authorized the denial of confrontation and cross-examination nor could
such authorization be inferred from the passive acquiesence of the President
in the operation of the system.
7. See, e.g., Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938); Ohio Bell Tel. Co.
v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937); Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290
U.S. 190 (1933). In administrative adjudicative proceedings dealing purely
with the interpretation of policy or law the presentation of evidence is
neither appropriate nor required by due process. See 1 DAvis, ADm Nis-

LAW TREATISE § 7.01 (1958).
8. See Greene v. McElroy, supra note 5; Bowles v. Baer, 142 F.2d 787 (7th
Cir. 1944); In re S.E.C., 84 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1936), rev'd as moot sub nom.
Bracken v. S.E.C., 299 U.S. 504 (1936).
9. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1958).
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him to influence agency decision.' 0 The scope of agency "rule-making"
is, however, so broad-ranging from policy decisions affecting the
national economy to detailed rulings of interest to only a very few
persons-that generalizations about procedure in this area are impossible. Some agencies are controlled by procedural provisions in
the statutes which created them. For the rest, Congress, in the
Administrative Procedures Act, has given the individual only the
rights to make written presentations and to appear before an agency,
and even these rights are subject to a considerable degree of agency
discretion."
The investigative function of an agency does not attempt to determine anyone's rights but simply gathers information on which
legislative or executive action may be based. The courts have been
reluctant to give witnesses at investigations the full range of procedural rights, fearing that to do so would seriously hamper the
investigative process.' 2 A witness is protected against self-incrimination, 13 but he can not demand, as a constitutional right, the presence
of counsel, 14 a public hearing, 15 notification of possible charges against
him,16 or the names or testimony of other witnesses.1 7 Nor has he a
right to cross-examine other witnesses, submit rebutting testimony
or even be present at all the sessions of the investigation. As in
comparable congressional and grand jury inquiries, the possibility
that criminal charges against a witness may grow out of the investigation has not increased these rights.18 The courts apparently feel
that any abuse of the investigative process may be attacked and
corrected at the subsequent criminal trial.19 Although lower court
opinions have indicated that the safeguards of the Administrative
10. Bi Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915);
Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1949).
11. 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (1958).
12. Anonymous Nos. 6 & 7 v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 (1959); In 'e Groban,
352 U.S. 330 (1957); In re S.E.C., supra note 8; Norwegian Nitrogen Prods.
v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933).
13. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Adams v. Maryland, 347
U.S. 179 (1954); McCarthy v. Arnstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924).
14. Anonymous Nos. 6 & 7 v. Baker, supra note 12; In re Groban, supra note
12; United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923); Bowles
v. Baer, supra note 8; The Golden Sun, 30 F. Supp. 354 (S.D. Cal. 1939); Note,
58 COLUm. L. REV. 395 (1958); Note, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1214 (1941); Note, 32
ST. JoHN L. Rsv. 67 (1957).

15. Anonymous Nos. 6 & 7 v. Baker, supra note 12; In re Groban, supra
note 12.
16. Ibid.
17. Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. v. United States, supra note 12.
18. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929); McGrain v. Daugherty,
273 U.S. 135 (1927). The function of administrative investigations has
frequently been compared with that of a grand jury. United States v.
Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
19. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 334 (1957).
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Procedures Act apply to agency investigations,2 0 the wording of the
statute does not explicitly so provide.
Both the prevailing and the dissenting opinions in the instant case
disagreed with the lower court on the issue of authorization and
concentrated on the constitutional problem. The majority classified
the function of the Civil Rights Commission hearing as "purely investigative and fact-finding . . . [because] the Commission does not
and cannot take any affirmative action which will affect an in21
Working then from the proposition that
dividual's legal rights."1
"due process embodies the differing rules of fair play, which through
the years, have become associated with differing types of proceedings,"22 the majority examined the procedural practices of investigations conducted by congressional committees, presidential commissions,
administrative agencies and grand juries. From this analysis, the
majority concluded that although apprisal, confrontation, and crossexamination had at times been allowed as privileges, they had not
been given as a matter of constitutional right.23 Nor had the Administrative Procedures Act changed these historical practices since
the requirements of the act were limited to adjudicative and rulemaking proceedings. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, while concurring in
the result, felt that the case required a different approach. Like the
majority, he determined the requirements of due process by balancing the public interest against the risk of harm to the individual.
To grant the requested rights would divert the Commission from
its fact-finding objectives, greatly increase the length and formality
of its hearings, and deny to the Commission information which
would not be given unless kept secret. In evaluating the harm to the
individual, Justice Frankfurter recognized a distinction, not discussed
in the majority opinion, based on the purpose which the investigation served. Investigations can simply gather facts, but an activity
purporting to be an investigation can have as its "essential objective
. . . [the passing of] official judgment on individuals under scrutiny."24 Where this latter purpose predominates, the risk to the
individual is greater, for although harm can result from a factfinding investigation, it comes only collaterally as an incident to
20. Torras v. Stradley, 103 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Ga. 1952); United States v.

Smith, 87 F. Supp. 293 (D. Conn. 1949).

21. 363 U.S. at 441.
22. Id. at 442.
23. The Anonymous Nos. 6 & 7 and Groban cases seem controlling in the
instant case. In both, a state administrative investigation was being conducted in which a strong liklihood existed that criminal charges would be
developed against witnesses. In both cases, the fourteenth amendment was
held not to require that the witnesses be given apprisal, counsel or other
procedural safeguards. The majority here reaffirmed these decisions but
preferred to rest the instant case on independent grounds.
24. 363 U.S. at 490.
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the agency's primary function, while in an investigation, the very
purpose of which is to expose wrong-doing, harm flows directly from
the inquiry itself. In Frankfurter's view, this factor of purpose must
be considered, for it may so increase the proximity of the risk of harm
to the individual that fairness will require the safeguards of a
trial-like hearing. Using this approach, the critical problem becomes
the evaluation of the investigation's purpose. Here Frankfurter and
the dissenting Justices, Douglas and Black, differed. To Frankfurter,
the objective for which the Commission had been created was factfinding even though one of the facts to be found was the extent to
which officials had wrongfully denied voting rights. For Douglas and
Black "the investigation and hearing by the Commission . . . were
necessarily aimed at determining if criminal law had been violated." 25
As such, the hearings were a "fragmentation of proceedings against
accused people foreign to our system." 26 The Constitution, according
to these two Justices, recognizes only the grand jury and the Congress as accusatorial bodies which can operate without granting
individuals the rights of counsel, apprisal, confrontation and crossexamination.
The issues raised by this case are of great importance in view
of the growing significance of administrative agencies as a part of
government. The incredibly complex problems of modem society
seem to demand the expertise, continuity, and flexibility of the
administrative process for their solution. The very qualities which
make administrative agencies an excellent instrument of government
can be lost by binding them with too restrictive a code of procedure.
Investigations especially should be given free rein to discover the
information vital to intelligent policy making. But as the administrative process increasingly impinges upon the individual citizen, a
corresponding need arises to retain these agencies within proper
channels. Investigations can and do serve differing purposes. They
can and have been used for the avowed purpose of exposing individuals to public criticism. In an age of mass communications the
harm to the individual from a one-sided exposure can well be
greater than would result from an adjudication of his legal rights.
The flexibility of an administrative investigation can potentially
increase this harm, for the investigators are free, subject to their
own discretion, to editorialize on their findings. Such does not seem
to have been the case in the Civil Rights hearing, but the potential
was there. It is regrettable that the majority chose to avoid the
problem of this potential harm and continued to treat all investigations as a group, with the result that only traditionally recognized
25. Id. at 495.
26. Id. at 505.
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legal rights deserve the protection of due process. The forms which
agency activity can take and the injuries which it can inflict are too
varied to be subjected to inflexible classifications. Only an approach
such as Justice Frankfurter employed, although lacking the logical
symmetry and predictability desirable in the law, can adequately
adapt the principles of due process to all the abuses to which the
administrative investigation is vulnerable.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-STATE MAY
DISCHARGE EMPLOYEE FOR FAILURE TO PERFORM
STATUTORY DUTY TO ANSWER
Petitioner, an employee of a state welfare office, was subpoenaed to
appear before a sub-committee of the House Un-American Activities
Committee.1 On the same date, he received a reminder from state
officials of the California statute2 which made it the duty of a
subpoenaed public employee to appear and answer any questions
pertaining to subversive activities and provided that a failure to
comply would lead to dismissal for "insubordination." On his appearance before the Sub-Committee, petitioner, relying on the fifth
amendment, refused to answer any questions relating to his alleged
1. In this opinion, a permanent employee's dismissal was also reviewed.

His dismissal had been affirmed by the Civil Service Commission and the
Supreme Court of California. Held, affirmed by an evenly divided court,
without discussion. Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960).
2. CALIFORNIA Gov'T CODE § 1028.1:
"It shall be the duty of any public employee who may be subpoenaed or
ordered by the governing body of the state or local agency by which such
employee is employed, to appear before such governing body, or a committee or subcommittee thereof, or by a duly authorized committee of the
Congress of the United States . . .to appear before such committee or subcommittee, and to answer under oath a question or questions propounded
by such governing body, committee or subcommittee, or a member or
counsel thereof, relating to:
(a) Present personal advocacy by the employee of the forceful or violent
overthrow of the Government of the United States or of any state.
(b) Present knowing membership in any organization now advocating the
forceful or violent overthrow of the Government of the United States or of
any state.
(c) Past knowing membership at any time since October 3, 1945, in any
organization which, to the knowledge of such employee, during the time of
the employee's membership advocated the forceful or violent overthrow of
the Government of the United States or of any state.
(d) Questions as to present knowing membership of such employee in the
Communist Party or as to past knowing membership in the Communist Party.
A"
;kny employee who fails or refuses to appear or to answer under oath on
any ground whatsoever any such questions so propounded shall be guilty of
insubordination and guilty of violating this section and shall be suspended
and dismissed from his employment in the manner provided by law."
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subversive activity. Consequently, he was summarily discharged. 3
On appeal the dismissal was affirmed by the district court of appeal. A petition for review was denied without opinion by the
Supreme Court of California. On certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, held, affirmed. When a state employee, by reliance
on the fifth amendment, fails to perform his statutory duty to
answer questions concerning his allegedly un-American activities,
the employing state may dismiss him for insubordination without
violating the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Nelson
v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960).
During the past ten years several states have passed legislation
in an attempt to eliminate the subversive threat in various areas
of public employment. State and lower federal courts have generally
held a public employee may be dismissed for refusing to answer
questions concerning past affiliations pertinent to present employment, or for refusing to waive constitutional immunity before investigating committees. 4 These dismissals have been based on the
conclusion that such refusals amounted to incompetency, 5 insubordination, 6 or some other "good cause" 7 under an applicable statute.8
In decisions considering the constitutionality of such legislation, the
United States Supreme Court has held that the question of whether
the employee is or has been a Communist is relevant to his job
fitness, 9 but an "innocent" Communist may not be dismissed automatically; he must in fact be "knowingly" a party member. 10 The
Court has held it unreasonable to deny bar membership when such
denial is based solely on an adverse inference of bad moral character
drawn from a refusal to answer questions concerning subversion."
The Court's animosity for arbitrary dismissal in areas of constitutionally protected rights was emphasized in the Slochower 12 case,
which held that a college professor could not be automatically dismissed as provided for by state statute solely for invoking the fifth
amendment before a congressional investigating committee. But the
3. Because he had been a temporary employee, he was denied a hearing
before the Civil Service Commission; but he did not raise an objection on this
point.
4. See cases cited in 12 VAim. L. REv. 273 n.3 (1958).
5. Kaplan v. Philadelphia School Dist., 388 Pa. 213, 130 A.2d 672 (1957).
6. Steinmetz v. California State Bd. of Educ., 44 Cal. 2d 816, 285 P.2d 617
(1955).

7. Faxon v. School Corm'n, 331 Mass. 531, 120 N.E.2d 772 (1954).
8. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1028.1; MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 71 § 42 (Supp. 1957);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18: 13-17 (Supp. 1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 11-1122

(Supp. 1957).
9. Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
10. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
11. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 353 U.S. 252 (1956).
12. Slochower v. 'Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956),
L. REv. 139 (1956).

10 VAND.
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Court in Beilan13 has held that another school teacher's refusal to
answer similar questions asked by his superior, and later by a federal
sub-committee, did constitute statutory incompetency sufficient to
justify dismissal. And the Court the same day in Lerner14 held a
dismissal of an employee for refusal to answer questions concerning
subversion was not a denial of due process where his continued employment endangered governmental security.
The Court in the instant case rejected the petitioner's contention
that his discharge was arbitrary and unreasonable and was governed
by the Slochower holding. The "built-in" inference of guilt resulting
solely from a fifth amendment claim, which was the basis of that
decision, is not present in this case.1 5 The Court stated that the
Beilan and Lerner decisions controlled the instant case and that the
test to be applied is the failure of the employee to answer rather than
the invocation of any constitutional privilege.' 6 Because it was the
petitioner's statutory duty to appear and answer any questions
asked by the federal sub-committee, the majority opinion indicated
that refusal to answer, without more, would have been sufficient
grounds to discharge him. The fact that he based his refusal on
the fifth amendment is irrelevant because the dismissing authorities
did not employ that claim as a basis for drawing an inference of
17

guilt.

The decision in this case emphasizes, as did those of Beilan and
Lerner, that dismissal for refusal to answer does not violate due
process if it is not arbitrary or unreasonable and has not automatically
resulted from a claim of a constitutional privilege. The Court in
Beilan sharply limited the scope of Slochower and in the same motion, by equating refusal to answer with statutory incompetency,
nullified any meaning Konigsberg'8 might have had in the area of
public employment. Thus, the Court has indicated that the state's
right to consider such a refusal in determining incompetency or
insubordination in a dismissal proceeding is not an impairment of any
federal limitation in this area. 19 Once the relevance of inquiry has
been established, any refusal to answer, even under claim of con13. Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958). See 12

REV. 273, 275 (1958).

14. Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958), 72 HARv. L.
L. REV. 412, (1959), 12 VAND. L. REV. 273 (1958).
15. 362 U.S. at 7.

REV.

VAND.

L.

188 (1958), 57

MICH.

16. Ibid.
17. The Court pointed out that petitioner based his whole case on the

claim that his discharge was arbitrary and did not take issue with whether
or not he had been accorded a proper hearing; therefore no comment was
made on the question.
18. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., supra note 11.
19. Provided, of course, that no dismissal is automatically enforced as discussed above.
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stitutional privilege, will most likely prove disastrous to the employee. The decision seems desirable in that it preserves the investigating power needed by the state to meet any subversive threat in
the field of public employment.20

DAMAGES-REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT JURY TO CALCULATE
LOSS OF EARNINGS ON THE BASIS OF NET INCOME AFTER
TAXES
In a personal injury action, defendant requested the trial court
to instruct the jury' that any damages awarded for past or future loss
of earnings must be calculated on the basis of plaintiff's income after
deduction of income taxes.2 The instruction was refused and the
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal, held, affirmed.
Failure to instruct the jury that an award for past or future loss
of earnings must be calculated on basis of net income after taxes is
not error. McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 282 F.2d 34 (2d
Cir. 1960).
Due to the increasing significance of individual income taxation, a
controversy has arisen as to whether, in computing the amount of
damages in personal injury actions, loss of past or future earnings
should be determined on the basis of the plaintiff's annual gross
earnings or his net earnings, i.e., after taxes.3 The weight of
20. For recent state court decisions decided since the instant case, see
Board of Pub. Educ. v. Intille, 163 A.2d 420 (Pa. 1960), holding that dismissal

of school teachers for incompetency under state public school code was
denied because it was based on refusal to answer questions concerning subversion before a federal sub-committee. Court distinguished Beilan and
Nelson in the process of following Slochower; Lowenstein v. Newark Bd. of
Educ., 163 A.2d 156 (N.J. 1960), holding that the board's failure to inform a
teacher, who had refused to answer on the basis of the fifth amendment, of
the purpose of its questions concerning past affiliations justified teacher's refusal to answer on grounds of irrelevance and invasion of privacy. The court
felt Beilan was distinguishable because the question here was relevance of
questions regarding past conduct to present loyalty. Court stated that the
relationship of the questions to the object of the inquiry must appear; therefore, teacher's refusal was allowed because the board indicated no connection
between the two.
1. The instruction was worded in the following manner: "If your verdict
is in favor of plaintiff, you must calculate any past or future loss of earnings
on the basis of his net income after deduction of income taxes." 282 F.2d at
35.
2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 104: "(a). In General. . . . [Giross income
does not include . . . (2) the amount of any damages received (whether by

suit or agreement) on account of personal injuries
Though logically the amount of the award attributable to loss of earnings in
a personal injury action should be taxable under 61(a), the entire amount
appears to be exempt from taxation. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1960). See
Harnett, Torts and Taxes, 27 N.Y.U.L. REV. 614, 624-27 (1952).
3. A related problem is often involved in these cases, as it was in the
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authority in the United States 4 is that such computations must be
based on gross earnings. 5 It is difficult to determine the reasons for
the majority view, for at times the courts have confused the instant problem with the related one of whether the jury should be
instructed that the award is exempt from federal income taxes.6 The
reasons most often given by the courts are: (1) The taxes that
plaintiff would have paid on his lost earnings are too speculative to
consider due to possible changes in tax rates, deductions, exemptions
and the amount of other income earned by the plaintiff. 7 (2) The
relationship between plaintiff and third parties, i.e., the federal
government, should be disregarded in the assessment of such
damages.8 (3) The intent of Congress in expressly excluding personal injury judgments from taxation would be frustrated if net
instant case, viz.:

whether the jury may properly be instructed by the

court that their final award is not taxable income to the plantiff. 282 F.2d
at 35. Detailed consideration of this problem is beyond the scope of this
article, but the weight of authority is that such an instruction should not be
given. E.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brown, 93 Ga. App. 805, 92 S.E.2d
874 (1956); Highshew v. Kushto, 235 Ind. 505, 134 N.E.2d 555 (1956); Maus v.
New York, C. & St. L. R.R., 165 Ohio St. 281, 135 N.E.2d 253 (1956); Missouri-K-T R.R. v. McFerrin, 291 S.W.2d 931, 945 (Texas 1956). Contra:
Anderson v. United Air Lines, 183 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Cal. 1960); Atherly v.
MacDonald, Young & Nelson, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 2d 575, 298 P.2d 700 (1956)
(trial court failed to give proferred instruction; the appellate court held that
while it would have been "proper" so to instruct, it was not reversible
error to fail to do so; Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42
(1952).
The chief reasons advanced for not giving the instruction are: (1) Such
an instruction introduces matter extraneous and irrelevant to the problems
of juries. (2) Such an instruction assumes that but for such instruction the
jury might make findings or take actions which would be improper. (3)
Such an instruction is not in the interest of better judicial administration, as
it would create more problems than it would solve. See Morris, Personal
Injury Plaintiffs' Monetary Recoveries Under Federal Income Tax Law, 26

INS. COUNSEL J. 101 (1959); Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Personal Injury

Awards, 19 OHIO ST.L.J. 212, 231 (1958).
4. In England, which has an income tax provision similar to § 104(a), the
House of Lords in the case of British Transp. Comm'n v. Gourley, [1955J
3 All E.R. 796 overruled a long line of precedents and decided that net earnings would be used. The English decisions are discussed in Jolowicz,
Damages and Income Tax, 1959 CAmB. L.J. 86.
5. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Curl, 178 F.2d 497 (8th Cir. 1949); Stokes v.

United States, 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944); Combs v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0.
Ry., 135 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Iowa 1955) (dictum); O'Donnell v. Great
Northern Ry., 109 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Cal. 1951); Mitchell v. Emblade, 80
Ariz. 398, 298 P.2d 1034 (1956) (dictum); Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5
Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955); Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251
S.W.2d 42 (1952); Maus v. New York, C. & St. L. R.R., 165 Ohio St. 281, 135
N.E.2d 253 (1956). Contra: Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 180 F.2d 295 (9th
Cir. 1948) [but see discussion in 186 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1951)1; Armentrout
v. Virginian Ry. 72 F. Supp. 997 (S.D. W. Va. 1947); Floyd v. Fruit Indus.,
144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918 (1957); British Transp. Comm'n v. Gourley, supra
note 4.
6. Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., supra note 5; Maus v. New York, C. & St.
L. R.R., supra note 5; 33 B.U.L. REV. 114 (1953).
7. Stokes v. United States, supra note 5; Demsey v. Thompson, supra note

5.

8. Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., supra note 5.
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earnings rather than gross earnings is used as the basis of computation.9 (4) It is reasonable to assume that plaintiff will invest the
lump sum awarded for loss of future earnings so as to receive
interest or dividend income, which will itself be taxable; and if the
court is to consider taxation at one end by reducing plaintiff's judgment because of the taxes he would have paid on the lost earnings, it
would have to consider taxation at the other end by crediting plaintiff
10
for taxes he would have to pay on such interest or dividend income.
In supporting its decision in the instant case, the majority of the
court relied heavily on such general considerations as the conjecturality of future federal income tax liability," the limitations on the
capability of juries in this area,12 and the fact that income resulting
from an invested award is taxable.13 The dissent, 14 looking to this
particular plaintiff's circumstances, 15 pointed out that his marital
and dependents' exemptions are not likely to change.16 The dissenting
judge felt that the majority's three bases for determining the amount
of damages-life expectancy, future earning power and the discount
factor' 7-are no less speculative than the marital and dependents'
exemptions which the majority regards as too conjectural for consideration.' 8 The dissenting judge further contended that juries are
9. Ibid.
10. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 180 F.2d 295, 296 n.7 (9th Cir. 1948).
For a statement of other reasons, see 8 ARK. L. REv. 174 (1954).
11. Plaintiff, a 39-year-old bchelor at time of trial, could decrease his
taxable income by marriage and children: "Is the jury .. .to speculate ..on the procreative proclivities and potentialities of the plaintiff and his;
spouse?" 282 F.2d at 36.
The court also points out that (1) inflation might offset any excess in the
verdict due to failure to consider tax consequences, (2) the seemingly overcompensated plaintiff does not retain his entire recovery due to the usual
contingent fee arrangement in personal injury cases (282 F.2d at 38), and (3),
the consequences of any state income tax would have to be considered. 282:
F.2d at 37 n.9.
12. "It is answered that . . .the worst result from giving an instruction,
would be better than the best result from not giving one. This ignores that,
by imposing on the jury a task that the jury cannot reasonably be expected:
to perform, we would be likely to impair the quality of its performance in
areas of true competence." 282 F.2d at 37.
13. "Therefore, if a court is going to use income after taxes as a measure
of plaintiff's loss, it must add back the taxes which would be due on the
interest earned--else the award would not fully compensate for the loss."
Ibid.
14. Defendant did not enter into the record the income tax consequences
on plaintiff's income at its present rate of $4,800 per annum, and the
dissent states that for this reason, the instruction was properly refused.
However, since the dissenting judge believed there was reversible error in
not giving another instruction, supra note 3, he expressed the view that the
instruction in question should be given on a new trial if defendant offered
evidence of the taxability of plaintiff's present income.
15. Supra note 11.
16. 282 F.2d at 41.
17. Id. at 35.
18. Id. at 42. As regards inflation, the dissent assumes plaintiff will invest
the award so as to protect himself against future decreased spending power.
Furthermore, since defendant has neither responsibility for nor control over-
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capable of computing plaintiff's future earnings and tax liability
which would have resulted had there been no injury. 19
The merit in the instant case lies not in the decision reached, but
in the excellent analysis of the problem in both opinions; the discussions should provide a better foundation for courts faced with
this problem in the future. The majority's strong indorsement of
the general principle behind the refusal to give the instruction is
qualified, and its decision weakened, by its statement that the instruction should be given where the plaintiff is in such a high
income bracket that half of such income would be consumed by
taxes. To allow the size of plaintiff's income to be the controlling
factor would discriminate between plaintiffs on a basis having no
relation to the amount of damages suffered and would not reduce the
conjecturality as to future tax liability. The minority opinion prefers to handle each case on an ad hoc basis, allowing the instruction
when the computations required of the jury would not be too difficult.
This approach would be advantageous to a plaintiff whose future tax
liability is too conjectural to base his award on net earnings, but a
plaintiff in a case where such conjecturality is absent would be
prejudiced by the use of net earnings. In view of the weaknesses
in both the majority and minority views, it has been suggested that
the problem be avoided by allocating part of any recovery to pain
and suffering, mental anguish and medical expenses, which would
be non-taxable, and part to loss of earnings, which would be taxable.
A change in the present non-taxable status of amounts received for
loss of earnings in a personal injury suit would be required to effect
this approach. 20 The disadvantage to this approach is that, under
present tax laws, the plaintiff would be taxed on the entire amount
received in lieu of earnings in the year of receipt, resulting in a
much higher rate of taxation than if he reported his earnings on
an annual basis. If plaintiff could prorate the award to the years
when he would have earned the income the disadvantage would be
obviated. If a method of reasonably estimating plaintiff's future tax
liabilities could be devised, a major roadblock to the use of the instruction would be eliminated. Until an acceptable alternative is
found, courts will probably continue to follow the majority opinion,
hoping the debits and credits of each view will balance in the long
run.
the fee received by plaintiff's attorneys, he should not bear this burden when

the jury determines damages.
19. "Jurors are as sophisticated about income taxes as are judges; they
are just as able to make an estimate of ... taxes ... on the future earnings
....

" Ibid.

20. The procedure would be to include in gross income the amount received
in lieu of earnings. See Harnett, supra note 2.
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EVIDENCE-ADVERSE SPOUSAL TESTIMONY-WIFE
COMPELLED TO TESTIFY IN MANN ACT PROSECUTION
Petitioner was tried and convicted' of transporting a woman in
interstate commerce for purposes of prostitution in violation of the
Mann Act. 2 The woman had subsequently married petitioner and,
at the trial, was called by the prosecution and compelled to testify
against her husband over objections by herself and petitioner. On
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The
rule admitting adverse spousal testimony when the offense charged
is one against the person of the spouse applies to a Mann Act prosecution, when the wife is the victim of the offense; the underlying
purpose of the Mann Act necessitates a denial of the wife's privilege
to have her testimony excluded. Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S.

525 (1960).
At common law neither spouse was permitted to testify for or
against the other.3 It has been argued that the refusal of favorable
spousal testimony arose on the ground that the witness-spouse was
disqualified to testify for the other, while one or both spouses possessed a privilege to exclude adverse spousal testimony to the end
that domestic harmony might be maintained. 4 Early common law
cases, however, spoke strictly in terms of a disqualification regardless
of whether favorable or adverse testimony was involved; 5 similar
language was used by the Supreme Court of the United States in its
early adoption of the rule.6 Today statutory enactments have adopted,
modified, or abolished one or both phases of the rule in the state
courts, 7 while a continual narrowing has marked its history in the

federal courts. Indeed, in 1933 the Supreme Court expressly abolished
that part of the rule barring the favorable testimony of a spouse.8
1. Trial was held in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama. Appeal was taken by Wyatt, the petitioner, to the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the conviction. Wyatt v. United States,
263 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1959).
2. White Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1958).
3. 3 JONES, EVIDENCE § 798 (5th ed. 1958). Authorities have failed to establish the exact time of the rule's origin [8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2227 (3d

ed. 1940)], but it appears certain that the policy had become firmly rooted
in the common law by 1628, the date of Sir Edward Coke's First Institute:
"Note, it hath been resolved by the justices that a wife cannot be produced
either against or for her husband, 'qua sunt duae animae in carne una."'
CoxE, COMMENTARY UPoN LrTTON 6b (1628).
4. 2 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 601 (3d ed. 1940). The court proceeds upon the
privilege theory of adverse spousal testimony in the instant case.
5. CoxE, COMMENTARY UPON ITETON 6b (1628), cited note 3, supra;
Shenton v. Tyler, [1939] Ch. 620 rejected the privilege theory as to adverse

spousal testimony. See 1

MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE

86-87 (1957).

6. "It is a general rule that neither a husband nor wife can be a witness

for or against the other." Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 221 (1839).
7. The statutes are collected in 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 488 (3d ed. 1940)
and the 1959 supplement.

8. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933). It should be noted that the
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flespite a strong trend toward abolishing the exclusion of adverse
spousal testimony, 9 that phase of the rule has been retained in the
federal courts.10 The rule is, however, subject to the common law
,exception that such testimony is admissible when the offense of the
party-spouse is a criminal act against the person of the other." As
early as 1839 the Supreme Court acknowledged the applicability of
12
the exception "in cases of violence upon" the person of the spouse.
Submitting somewhat to the modern trend toward liberalizing the
entire common-law rule, the federal courts have subsequently interpreted the terms "violence" and "person" so as to make the
exception applicable in cases involving "a serious moral wrong inflicted upon [the spouse]."' 13 From this interpretation has grown an
ever-increasing line of cases holding that the wife's testimony is
admissible when she is the "victim" of her husband's violation of the
Mann Act. 14 An examination of these cases reveals an increasing
tendency on the part of federal courts to speak in terms of privilege
rather than disqualification, giving rise to the problem of determining to whom the privilege belongs. 15 At least two circuit courts have
held that the privilege belongs to either spouse, 16 and the Supreme
Court continued to speak of adverse spousal testimony in terms of an incompetency when, speaking of the wife's testimony in the case, it remarked:
"Her competency to testify against him is not involved." 290 U.S. at 373.
(Emphasis added.)
9. See Yoder v. United States, 80 F.2d 665, 668 (10th Cir. 1935). Statutes
abolishing this phase of the rule are included in Wigmore's collection in 2
WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 488 (3d ed. 1940).
10. "While the rule forbidding testimony of one spouse for the other
was supported by reasons which time and changing legal practices had
undermined, we are not prepared to say the same about the rule barring

testimony of one spouse against the other." Hawkins v. United States, 358
U.S. 74, 77 (1958).
11. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2239 (3d ed. 1940).
12. Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 222 (1839).
13. Cohen v. United States, 214 Fed. 23, 29 (9th Cir. 1914) (wife allowed,
but not compelled, to testify against husband in Mann Act prosecution).
For an excellent survey of the application of the exception in both state
and federal courts, see Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 646 (1950).
14. Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1949), 11 A.L.R.2d 635,
overruling Johnson v. United States, 221 Fed. 250 (8th Cir. 1915); Hayes v.
United States, 168 F.2d 996 (10th Cir. 1948); Levine v. United States, 163
F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1947); United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir.
1943), aff'd on rehearing, 138 F.2d 831, cert. denied, 321 U.S. 794 (1943). In
Yoder v. United States, 80 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1935), the court went even
further, admitting the wife's testimony in a Mann Act case even though the
wife was not the person transported in violation of the act. But see Hawkins
v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
15. States that have created a spousal privilege by statute disagree on
this issue. The statutes are included in the collection in 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 488 (3d ed. 1940), and a listing of the states and their respective views
on this problem may be found in Note, 33 TUL. L. REV. 884, 888 (1959).
16. "The right under the common law rule, of an accused not to have his
spouse testify against him, and the equal right of such spouse to refuse
to do so were privileges created by and having their existence only within
the scope of the rule itself." Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838, 841 (8th
Cir. 1949), overruling Johnson v. United States, 221 Fed. 250 (8th Cir. 1915).
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Court appears to have approved that view in the recent case of
Hawkins v. United States.'7
In the instant case, the Court "unhesitatingly" approved the
circuit court decisions 18 applying the common-law exception to Mann
Act cases where the wife is the "victim" of the offense. 19 Adopting
the privilege theory,2 0 the Court declared that better reason supports the view giving both spouses the privilege 2' and that in cases
where the party-spouse is denied his privilege, it does not necessarily
follow that the privilege is also lost to the witness.2 Carefully
stressing that its decision is applicable only to Mann Act cases,2 the
Court stated that a primary purpose of this act is to protect the
women with whom it deals against themselves-against their own
inability to exercise will power. If a woman's husband can induce
her to travel from one state to another for purposes of prostitution,
it may be assumed that he can as easily persuade her to refuse giving
testimony against him.24 Furthermore, the offender's power over
the woman could enable him to induce her into marriage for the
express purpose of gaining the privilege for this key witness. 25 To
allow the retention of the privilege by the witness-wife would be
to defeat the purpose of the Mann Act in protecting weak women
against themselves. Hence, the privilege to exclude the testimony
should be denied both party and witness and the witness compelled
26
to give adverse testimony.
In United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943), the court states:
"[T]he better view is that the privilege is that of either spouse who chooses
to claim it." 137 F.2d at 1008.
17. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).

"Over the years the rule has evolved from the

common-law absolute disqualification to a rule which bars the testimony
of one spouse against the other unless both consent." Hawkins v. United
States, 358 U.S. at 78.
18. See note 14 supra.
19. 362 U.S. at 526-27.

20. The Court cites Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958) (see note
17 supra); United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943) (see note
16 supra); 8 WIGMORE, EvImcE § 2241 (3d ed. 1940).

21. "At least some of the bases of the party's privilege are in reason
applicable to that of the witness. . . . In light of these considerations, we
decline to accept the view that the privilege is that of the party alone." 362
U.S. at 529.

22. "Certainly, we would not be justified in laying down a general rule

that both privileges stand or fall together." 362 U.S. at 529. But see Shores
v. United States, 174 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1949) (dictum; see note 16 supra).
23. "[We] intimate no view on the applicability of the privilege of either
a party or a witness similarly circumstanced in other situations." 362 U.S.
at 531.
24. 362 U.S. at 530.
25. 362 U.S. at 531.
26. Warren, Black and Douglas dissent on grounds that: (1) the fact
that the wife in the instant case was the victim of her husband's offense
is not sufficient to warrant a departure from the decision in Hawkins v.
United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958), where the victim was another woman;
and (2) the majority is in error in saying that it should be assumed that
the wife was under the influence of her husband in refusing to testify, be-
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Through a tedious but sound probing into the underlying purpose
of the Mann Act, the Court in the instant case denied the privilege.
However, one portion of the Court's opinion certainly implies that
even an additional privilege could be recognized in cases not involving
the Mann Act. When it is said that the exception is applicable in a particular case but that in such a case the privileges of party and witness
do not necessarily stand or fall together, 27 it follows that in some cases
the witness-spouse may have what amounts to an additional privilege
to bar a strict and complete application of the exception. A quite
plausible argument can be and has been made in favor of the idea
that the so-called privilege of the witness-spouse should stand
or fall with that of the party when the "offense-against-spouse"
exception applies. In Shores v. United States,2 8 where the wife was
victim of her husband's violation of the Mann Act, the court stated
by way of dictum that no privilege existed in either spouse, "since
the privilege ... existed only by virtue of the rule" and "necessarily
did not extend to any situation, such as here, which had been left
outside the rule by the exception." 29 In view of the opinion in the
instant case, however, especially considering the Court's emphasis
upon the fact that it is dealing only with Mann Act situations, it is
probable that in most cases the privilege of the witness-spouse will
not in the future be materially affected in the federal courts by the
30
applicability of the exception.

FEDERAL PROCEDURE-CHANGE OF VENUE-TRANSFER OF
CIVIL ACTION MUST BE TO DISTRICT HAVING STATUTORY
VENUE
Plaintiff-respondents, by virtue of diversity of citizenship, brought
a stockholder's derivative action1 for damages in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The defendantcause such an assumption requires an evaluation of the mental state of the
wife.
27. 362 U.S. at 529.
28. 174 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1949).
29. Id. at 841.
30. The court gives a somewhat vague test to be used in determining
whether or not the privilege of the witness should be denied when, because
of the exception, that of the party is denied: "It is a question in each case
or in each category of cases, whether, in light of the reason which has led
to a refusal to recognize the party's privilege, the witness should be held
compellable." 362 U.S. at 529.
1. Two lower court decisions were affirmed in this case. One of them
Blaski v. Hoffman, 260 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 359 U.S. 904
(1959), whose facts are not set forth in the accompanying text because of
their complexity, involved the following situation: Respondents brought a
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petitioners moved, under the federal change of venue statute,2 to
transfer the action to the United States District Court for the
District of Utah. This motion was granted, in spite of the argument
of the respondents that the statute required statutory venue over
defendant in the transferee court, as opposed to consent venue.
On respondents' petition the court of appeals issued a writ of
mandamus directing the district court to reverse its order. 3 On
4
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, held, affirmed.
The federal provision for transfer of civil actions permits transfer
only to courts in which the plaintiff could have originally laid proper
statutory venue. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
The doctrine of forum non conveniens5 has been forged into a
useful judicial tool by some American courts6 in the last three
patent infringement action in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas, the only district court in which statutory venue
would lie. The defendants in that case, relying on 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (see
note 2 infra), moved for and were granted a transfer of the action to the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. After the
First Circuit Court of Appeals denied respondents' petition for writ of
mandamus vacating the transfer order, Ex parte Blaski, 245 F.2d 737 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 872 (1957), they moved the Illinois district court
for a remand of the action to the Texas court. Upon denial of this motion
by the Illinois district court, they appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, which issued a mandamus ordering the case to be remanded to the
Texas court. Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court of the United
States.
Though this case involved the additional question of res judicata, which
is outside of the scope of this comment, both this case and the one described
in the text turn on the important question of the interpretation of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a).
2. "§ 1404. Change of Venue. (a) For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action
to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) (1958).
3. Behimer v. Sullivan, 261 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 361 U.S.
809 (1959).
4. 14r. Justice Whittaker wrote the majority opinion. Mr. Justice Stewart
concurred in a short separate opinion. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by
Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Brennan, dissented.
5. This doctrine originated in some rather nebulous decisions of the courts
of Scotland. See, e.g., Williamson v. North-Eastern Ry., 21 Scot. L.R. 421
(Ct. of Sessions 1884) (case dismissed); Brown v. Cartwright, 20 Scot. L.R.
818 (Ct. of Sessions 1883) (plea denied); Prescott v. Graham, 20 Scot. L.R.
573 (Ct. of Sessions 1883) (plea denied). The phrase forum non conveniens
was little used in the United States until Paxton Blair wrote his now classic
law review article of the subject: The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens
in Anglo-American Law, 29 CoLum. L. REv. 1 (1929). It is said that "in
1929 a law review writer [Blair] brought the term 'forum non conveniens'
into American law, contending that all American courts had inherent power
to decline jurisdiction under the doctrine. After this article the use of
the term became so general that in 1941 Justice Frankfurter referred to the
'familiar doctrine of forum non conveniens' as a manifestation of a civilized
judicial system which is 'firmly embedded in our law' [Baltimore & O.R.R.
v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 55 (1941)]." Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum non
Conveniens, 35 CA=ar. L. REV. 380, 388 (1947).
6. Despite the adoption of this doctrine by the federal courts (see notes 7
& 9 infra), and the general use of the term, this doctrine has apparently
been unconditionally accepted by only the following states. Florida: Hagen
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decades. This doctrine allows a court to use its discretion to decline
to exercise its jurisdiction whenever it appears, for a variety of
reasons,7 that the cause before it may be more appropriately tried
elsewhere. The issue of whether the federal courts could apply this
doctrine was settled affirmatively in the cases of Koster v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co.8 and Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert.9 The harshness of
the dismissal of plaintiff's action under this doctrine as well as the
reach of Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Kepner1° caused Congress, in 1948,
to enact section 1404 (a) of the Federal Judicial Code. 1 Shortly thereafter, the federal courts were called upon to interpret the phrase
v. Viney, 124 Fla. 747, 169 So. 391 (1936); Louisiana: Union City Transfer
v. Fields, 199 So. 206 (La. App. 1940); Massachusetts: Universal Adjustment
Co. v. Midland Bank, Ltd., 281 Mass. 303, 184 N.E. 152 (1933); New Hampshire: Jackson & Sons v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 86 N.H. 341, 168 Atl.
895 (1933); New Jersey: Kantakevich v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 18 N.J.
Misc. 77, 10 A.2d 651 (Hudson County Cir. Ct. 1940); New York: Gregonis
v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 235 N.Y. 152, 139 N.E. 223 (1923).
7. The general rule for applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
as set forth in Koster v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 527
(1947), is: "[Tihe ultimate inquiry is where trial will best serve the
convenience of the parties and the ends of justice." More specifically, the
Court there set forth other factors, such as the "convenience of parties or
witnesses, the appropriateness of a trial in a forum familiar with the law of
the corporation's domicile, and the enforceability of the remedy if one be
granted." Ibid. The court in this case seemed to place great emphasis on
defendant's showing that he would suffer much harassment and the plaintiff
little convenience if the court exercised its jurisdiction. See Reep v. Butcher,
176 Misc. 369, 27 N.Y.S.2d 330 (Steuben County Sup. Ct. 1941) (both
parties non-residents; causes of action arose outside state); Union City
Transfer v. Fields, 199 So. 206 (La. App. 1940) (Dicta: inconvenience great;
amount in controversy small; court had insufficient knowledge of another
state's law).
8. See note 7 supra.
9. 330 U.S. 501 (1947). A Virginia resident sued a Pennsylvania corporation in a New York federal district court. The Court, in dismissing
the action, said that "important considerations are the relative ease of access
to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of
unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and
all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive." Id. at 508.
10. 314 U.S. 44 (1941). Defendant here sought an injunction in an Ohio
court to stop an Ohio resident from bringing an action for damages sustained in Ohio under the FELA in a federal district court in New York. The
Ohio court denied the injunction and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding
that under the FELA venue provision the plaintiff could bring a suit wherever the defendant was doing business.
11. The revisory committee's note to this section is as follows:
"Subsection (a) was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum
non conveniens, permitting transfer to a more convenient forum, even
though the venue is proper. As an example of the need of such a provision, see Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 86 LEd
28, 62 SCR 6, which was prosecuted under the Federal Employer's [sic]
Liability Act in New York, although the accident occurred and the employee
resided in Ohio. The new subsection requires the court to determine that
the transfer is necessary for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and
further, that it is in the interest of justice to do so." H.R. Rm. No. 2646,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. A127 (1948). Subsection (a) has been quoted in note
2 supra.
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here in issue: "where it might have been brought." Of the federal
district court cases which have construed this clause, seven have
held that, if the defendant consents, the action may be transferred
to a court to whose venue or process the defendant might originally
have objected. 12 Three district court cases have held or implied to
the contrary, 3 and two others have denied without discussion such
a motion by the defendant. 14 Of the circuit courts, the Third Circuit
has ruled in favor of a defendant's motion to transfer the action to a
court where the defendant might have objected to venue.15 The First
and Second Circuits have ruled in favor of defendant's motion to
transfer the case to a court where the defendants could not have
been served with process, 16 and the Second and Fifth have granted
defendant's motion to transfer the action to a place where there was
neither statutory venue nor opportunity to serve the defendant.' 7 The
Seventh Circuit decision in the instant case is the sole appellate court
case which has held that the action can be removed only to a court
where statutory venue lies.
The Court here disagreed with petitioners' contention that the
phrase "where it might have been brought" should be broadly construed so as to empower the district court to transfer an action to
any court "where it may now be rebrought, with defendant's consent."' 8 The Court found that the language of the section was un12. McGee v. Southern Pac. Co., 151 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Hill v.

Upper Miss. Towing Co., 141 F. Supp. 692 (D. Minn. 1956); Cain v. Bowater's
Newfoundland Pulp & Paper Mills, Ltd., 127 F. Supp. 949 (D. Pa. 1954); Welch
v. Esso Shipping Co., 112 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Mire v. Esso Shipping
Co., 112 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Anthony v. RKO Radio Pictures, 103
F. Supp. 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). See also the quotation from the unreported
oral decision of the Illinois district court in Blaski v. Hoffman, 363 U.S.
335 (1960).
13. Felchlin v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 136 F. Supp. 577 (S.D. Cal.
1955); General Elec. Co. v. Central Transit Warehouse Co., 127 F. Supp. 817
(W.D. Mo. 1955); Tivoli Realty, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 89 F. Supp.
278 (D. Del. 1950). In Johnson v. Harris, 112 F. Supp. 338, 341 (E.D. Tenn.
1953), the court stated by way of dictum that "section 1404(a), Title 28
U.S.C.A. providing for transfer of a case comtemplates statutory venue and
not consent venue." (Emphasis added.) This statement would seem to
align this Tennessee court with the decision of the majority in the principal
case.
14. Silbert v. Nu-Car Carriers, III F. Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Hampton
Theatres, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Co., 90 F. Supp. 645 (D.D.C. 1950).
15. Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Rodney, 186 F.2d III (3d Cir. 1950).
16. Torres v. Walsh, 221 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1955) (admiralty); In re
Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 184 (Ist Cir. 1954). "[Ilt seems to us altogether
proper to hold that a case may be transferred to a district not having
statutory venue provided the defendant or defendants for whose benefit the
venue privilege is conferred agree to waive the same. Such an interpretation
indeed is to be favored, since it tends to enhance the usefulness of this
important provision for administrative transfer of cases in the interest of
convenience and justice." (Emphasis added.)
17. Ex parte Blaski, 245 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1957); Anthony v. Kaufman,
193 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1951).
18. 363 U.S. at 342-43. (Emphasis added.)
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ambiguous, direct and clear. 19 By reason of this lucidity and the
legislative history of the act, the Court stated that the only logical
interpretation of the statute is that of the lower appellate court in
the instant case:
If when a suit is commenced, plaintiff has a right to sue in that district, independently of the wishes of defendant, it is a district "where the
action might have been brought." If he does not have that right, independently of the wishes of defendant, it is not a district "where it might
have been brought," and it is immaterial that the defendant subsequently [makes himself subject, by consent, waiver of venue and
personal jurisdiction defenses or otherwise, to the jurisdiction of some
other form].20
The majority added that to adopt the petitioners' viewpoint would
be "gross discrimination" in that, upon a finding of convenience, a
district court could transfer an action, over the protestations of a
plaintiff, to any district that the defendant, but not the plaintiff, desired. On the other hand, the plaintiff would have to obtain the
defendant's consent before his motion to transfer to a court not having
statutory venue would be granted. 21
The dissenters, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, set forth
several reasons for a broader construction of the phrase "where it
might have been brought." In the first place, they disagree with the
majority who maintain that the phrase has a "plain meaning."22 They
point to the fact that the district courts and the courts of appeals
have reached conflicting interpretations of the statute, and that the
preponderance of these interpretations is in conflict with the view
of the majority opinion.23 Furthermore, the dissent contends that the
majority's narrow interpretation of the clause gives insufficient
consideration to the ordinary rules of statutory venue, because these
rules take into account the consent of the defendant to proceed in a
forum not designated by statute.24 Neither will the dissent adopt
the majority's view that the plaintiff is being subjected to discrimination; rather, argue the dissenters, if section 1404 (a) is properly
administered, such discrimination would be more than counterbalanced by the requirement that the transfer serve the interests of
convenience and justice. 25
The issue in this case-whether the questioned statute requires
statutory venue or consent venue-is significant because of its bearing
on the orderly and efficient administration of justice. The majority
19. Id. at 343.
20. 363 U.S. at 344, quoting 260 F.2d at 321.
21. 363 U.S. at 344.
22. Id. at 352-53, 358-59.
23. Id. at 355-58. See notes 12-17 supra,and accompanying text.
24. 363 U.S. at 362-63.
25. Id. at 365-66.
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bases its holding on the finding that the words of the statute are
direct, unambiguous and clear.26 This is an unusual conclusion in
view of the conflict found in the lower courts in regard to the
interpretation of the statute; indeed, a majority of the lower courts
27
have interpreted the statute inconsistently with the present holding.
28
Furthermore, can a word, the "skin of a living thought," ever be
plain, unambiguous, and clear? 29 Holmes said that "a word generally
has several meanings, even in the dictionary ... [You] very likely
has a shade of significance more refined than any
will see that it...
given in the word book."30 It would seem that words must always
be subjected to the imperatives of external circumstances for a
determination of their meaning.31 Does not every statute require at
least a modicum of interpretation; a fortiori interpretation is essential in a situation such as this where the lower courts have
extracted different and conflicting meanings from the questioned
provisions. Since the words "statutory venue" are not found in the
text of the statute, it is apparent that the Court, subconsciously or
not, did indeed resort to the interpretive process; for it might just
as well have found that the words "where it might have been brought"
meant that an action could be transferred to any district where it
26. Id. at 343. The Court also says that "the thesis urged by, petitioners
Id. at 344.
. . do violence to the plain words of § 1404(a) ....
(Emphasis added.)
27. See notes 12-17 supra, and accompanying text for examples of different
interpretations of the statute in question.
28. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Justice Holmes): "A word
is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought
and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances
and the time in which it is used."
29. See McBaine, The Rule Against Disturbing Plain Meaning of Writings,
31 CA=F. L. REV. 145, 157 (1943).
30. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARv. L. REv. 417
would .

(1899). Cf. Stone, Justice, Language and Communication, 14 VAND. L. REv.
331 (1960).
31. Wigmore, dealing with the interpretation of words in wills, deeds,
contracts, etc., says that "the truth had finally to be recognized that words
always need interpretation; that the process of interpretation inherently and
invariably means the ascertainment of the association between words and
Once freed from the primitive formalism which views
external objects ....
the document as a self-contained and self-operative formula, we can fully
appreciate the modern principle that the words of a document are never
anything but indices to extrinsic things, and that therefore all the circumstances must be considered which go to make clear the sense of the words,-that is, their association with things." 9 WiGMomR, EviD xcE § 2470 (3d ed.
1940). It is submitted that these premises should also apply to statutes.
Wigmore himself, speaking in part of the above-quoted premises, says that
"a statute is an act of expression by a legislative body; and, as a legal act,
it presents the same problems as to intention, integration, form, and interpretation, as other legal acts." 9 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra at § 2478. All the
rules regarding the interpretation of words in non-statutory legal documents
should be, and generally have been, applied to statutes, for as Holmes said:
"Different rules conceivably might be laid down for the construction of
different kinds of writing. . . . Yet in fact we do not deal differently with
a statute from our way of dealing with a contract." Holmes, supra note 30,
at 419.
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could have been commenced s2 So, assuming that the Court did
interpret the statute, the question logically follows: "Was the Court's
interpretation the correct one?" It would seem that the Court's
holding, measured by any reasonable criteria for interpreting
.statutes,3s is open to question. The subject-matter with which the
.statute deals is the locating of trials so as to best serve the ends of
justice. It is clear, however, that here the ends of justice and the
convenience of the parties and witnesses could best be furthered by
the transfer of the case.34 In addition, such a transfer would be
consistent with the intention of the codifiers, who would advocate
transfer only if the convenience of parties and witnesses, as well as
the interest of justice, were thereby benefitted. No intention to
limit the transfer to districts having statutory venue is found. To
the contrary, section 1406 (b) of the Federal Judicial Code,35 which
specifically allows venue to be waived, would have relevance here
in determining the intention of the codifiers. Therefore, scant justification can be found for the majority's decision, unless it be that to
adopt the dissenters' position would discriminate against the plaintiff.
But how can the plaintiff be discriminated against if the case is
transferred "in the interest of justice." It is therefore submitted that
the majority's position is questionable on the basis of history, legislative intent, and logic, and appears to be a serious restriction on the
-use of the statute for the furtherance of justice.
32. See McCorley v. Foster-MIilburn Co., 89 F. Supp. 643, 645 (W.D.N.Y.
1950) ("brought" and "commenced" are synonymous).
33. Frederich J. DeSloovere, editor of Cases on the Interpretation of
Statutes (1931), has suggested the following as criteria for the interpretation
of statutes: "[E]very statute must be interpreted in the light of (1) the
subject-matter with which it deals; (2) the reason or purpose behind its
enactment as found in the text and the evil toward which it was directed
(including here extrinsic aids and the common-law); and (3) the meanings
of the several other relevant parts of the same statute or of statutes in pari
materia." DeSloovere, Contextual Interpretation of Statutes, 5 FowuHm L.
REv. 219 (1936).
34. In the Blaski case several actions involving the same patents were
pending in the transferee court, and the pre-trial and discovery steps taken
in those actions had developed a substantial amount of relevant and useful
evidence pertinent to the principal case. In the Behimer case, the transferee

court would have been more convenient because: all of the officers of the
allegedly exploited corporation lived in the district of the transferee court;
the books and records of that corporation were in that district; the substantive law of the state of the transferee district would govern the action; and,
Inally, the calendar of the transferee court was less congested than that
of the transferor court.
35. "Nothing in this chapter shall impair the jurisdiction of a district court
of any matter involving a party who does not interpose timely and sufficient
objection to the venue." 28 U.S.C. § 1406(b)

(1958).

1961]

RECENT CASES

FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-SUIT ALLOWED FOR
NEGLIGENCE EVEN THOUGH ACCOMPANIED BY
MISREPRESENTATION
An appraiser for the Federal Housing Administration inspected
certain residential property which the plaintiffs were interested in
purchasing and approved the same for loan insurance' under the
National Housing Act.' A written statement of the appraised value
as determined by the agent was furnished to the plaintiffs who
thereupon purchased the property. Several days thereafter substantial defects were discovered in the foundation of the residence. 2
Plaintiffs instituted an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act 3
to recover damages resulting from the negligence of the agent in
making the appraisal. The government did not deny the faulty
appraisal but contended that the claim was founded upon misrepresentation, for which the government was exempted from liability
under the act. On appeal from a verdict for the plaintiffs, held,
affirmed. Where the government assumes a duty and is negligent in
performing it, a party who is thereby injured may recover damages
from the United States even though the negligent performance is
accompanied by a misrepresentation. United States v. Neustadt,
281 F.2d 596 (4th Cir. 1960).
Sovereign immunity of the federal government in the field of
torts is waived to a considerable extent by the Federal Tort Claims
Act.4 The statute provides that the government is liable as a private
person for the negligence or wrongful acts or omissions of its employees while acting within the scope of their employment.5 There
1. 48 Stat. 1246 (1934), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-50 (1958). The act
empowers the Federal Housing Commissioner to insure mortgages on residential property if the mortgage complies with certain requirements and
involves an obligation not in excess of a certain percentage of the appraised
value. Application for insurance is made by an approved financial institu-

tion whereupon an inspection of the property is made to determine whether
it meets the standards prescribed and to fix the appraised value. The seller,
builder, or other person so directed by the commissioner, is required to
deliver to the purchaser, prior to the sale, a written statement setting
forth the amount of the appraised value determined by the agent. 48 Stat.
1248 (1934),

12 U.S.C. §§ 1709(a),

(b)(2) (1958); 68 Stat. 607 (1954), 12

U.S.C. § 1715q (1958).
2. Due to the nature of the subsoil, the foundation was settling in an
unusual manner so that large cracks had appeared in both the interior and
exterior walls and the sun porch had separated itself from the house. To
prevent further damage, underpinning the foundation was necessary at a cost

of several thousand dollars.

3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401-02, 2411-12, 2671-80 (1958).

4. The act may be considered as a general waiver of immunity if contrasted with the piecemeal legislation enacted prior to 1946 which permitted
suits against the government only in certain specified areas. For legislative

history and background, see Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34
YALE L.J. 1 (1924); Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE L.J. 534

(1947).

5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2672, 2674 (1958).
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are several express exceptions to the waiver, one of which exempts
the government from liability for claims arising out of misrepresentation.6 A number of courts,7 following Jones v. Unitec States,8 hold
that this exception includes negligent misrepresentations as well as
wilful misrepresentations. Under this view, recovery generally is
denied where there is a negligent act accompanied by a misrepresentation upon which the plaintiff has relied. 9 These courts reason
that the theory of the action is misrepresentation since without the
communication there would be no injury resulting from the negligent
act.10
6. "The provisions . . . shall not apply to-...

(h) any claim arising out

of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference
with contract rights." 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1958). (Emphasis added.) The
reasons for providing these exclusions were the difficulty of defending such
suits and the probability of judgments against the government in amounts out
of proportion to damage actually suffered by claimants. For criticism of
allowing these exceptions, see 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 29.13, at 1654
(1956).
7. See, e.g., Hall v. United States, 274 F.2d 69 (10th Cir. 1959); Miller
Harness Co. v. United States, 241 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1957); National Mfg.
Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 967
(1954); Anglo-American & Overseas Corp. v. United States, 144 F. Supp.
635 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), af'd, 242 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1957); Clark v. United States,
218 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1954) (dictum).
8. 207 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 921 (1954). Pointing
out the appearance of "deceit" in the same exemption clause (see note 6
supra) the court reasoned that "as 'deceit' means fraudulent misrepresentation, 'misrespresentation' must have been meant to include negligent misrepresentation, since otherwise the word 'misrepresentation' would be
duplicative. The construction is strengthened by the inclusion of libel which
may be either negligent or intentional." Id. at 564. (Footnote omitted.)
Plaintiff had sought damages for loss on a sale of oil stock made in reliance upon misinformation voluntarily given by members of the United
States Geological Survey; recovery was denied under the misrepresentation
exclusion. The lower court had noted that members of the geological survey
are forbidden to execute surveys for private parties.
9. E.g., Jones v. United States, supra note 8. In Clark v. United States,
supra note 7, plaintiffs suffered damages in reliance upon erroneous flood
and weather reports issued by the government. The court found that
reasonable care had been exercised, but added, if negligence were present
there could be no recovery since the claim was based upon misrepresentation.
A case with similar facts is National Mfg. Co. v. United States, supra note 7,
though here the government was found to be negligent. The court held
that the Flood Control Act exonerated the government from liability and
also that the claim was within the misrepresentation exception of the Tort
Claims Act. Cf. Otness v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 647 (D.C. Alaska
1959) where a shipowner sought to recover for the loss of his vessel occasioned by a collision with a submerged channel light which the government
had undertaken to locate, but had negligently failed to find, and concerning
which it had issued a bulletin stating that the light was not in the channel.
It was held that governmental immunity from liability for misrepresentation did not relieve the government from liability for the failure to exercise
reasonable care in carrying out its duties of maintaining maritime aids.
10. "[The statute] cannot be avoided by alleging negligence in the act
of testing rather than in the words of the representation because in either
case the claim 'arose out of' misrepresentation; if there had been no misrepresentation the plaintiff would not have been damaged." Anglo-American
& Overseas Corp. v. United States, supra note 7, at 637. (Footnotes omitted.)
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In the instant case, the court followed the statutory construction

set forth in Jones v. United States, but held that the exclusion does
not apply to every situation where there is some communication
involved in the chain of events that lead to the injury. Pointing
out that misrepresentation is actually an element in many forms
of wrongful conduct, 12 the court viewed the representation as separable from the negligent act. It found that the gravamen of the
offense of which the plaintiffs complain is not the communication of
the appraised value but rather the careless appraisal itself.13 The
court, referring to the requirement that a written statement of the
appraisal be furnished to prospective vendees, 14 held that the government owes a specific duty to purchasers to appraise the property with
reasonable care and diligence despite the absence of a contractual
relationship. It noted that in most of the cases where recovery has
been denied, the claim could only have been based upon the misrepresentation, since the acts complained of were not executed in
the performance of a specific duty to the plaintiffs 15 or the statute
Here a merchant purchased adulterated tomato paste which had been inspected by agents of the Food and Drug Administration who issued notices
that the paste could enter the country. The merchant had sustained a loss
when the paste was later found to be adulterated and destroyed. In Hall v.
United States, supra note 7, an employee of the Department of Agriculture
negligently tested plaintiff's cattle and informed him that the cattle were
diseased. Thereupon plaintiff sold the cattle at less than fair market value
although in fact none of the cattle were diseased. The court denied recovery
holding the theory of the claim was misrepresentation since the loss came
about because the agent misrepresented the condition of the cattle and
not because he erred when they were tested.
11. The court pointed out that the government had been held liable for
the negligent operation of a lighthouse in Indian Towing Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955), and for the negligent marking of a wreck in
Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951), where
there was no discussion of the exemption although misrepresentation was
necessarily involved.
12. "Misrepresentation runs all through the law of torts, as a method of
accomplishing various types of tortious conduct which, for reasons of historical development or as a matter of convenience, usually are grouped
under categories of their own ....
A great many of the common and familiar
forms of negligent conduct, resulting in invasions of tangible interests of
person or property, are in their essence nothing more than misrepresentation,
from a misleading signal by a driver of an automobile about to make a turn,
or an assurance that a danger does not exist, to false statements or nondisclosure of a latent defect by one who is under a duty to give warning.
In all such cases the particular form which the defendant's conduct has
taken has become relatively unimportant, and misrepresentation has been
merged to such an extent with other kinds of misconduct that neither the
courts nor legal writers have found any occasion to regard it as a separate
basis of liability." PROSSER, TORTS § 86, at 520-21 (2d ed. 1955). (Footnotes
omitted.)
13. Thus the case is analogous to Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135
N.E. 275 (1922), where a public weigher, who erroneously stated the weight of
merchandise, was held liable not for careless words but for careless performance of the act of weighing.
14. See note 1 supra.
15. Clark v. United States, 218 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1954), discussed in
note 9 supra; Anglo-American & Overseas Corp. v. United States, 144 F.
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involved expressly exempted the government from liability in
carrying out the acts. 16 Thus, the court concluded that the liability
in the instant case is not based upon misrepresentation but upon th2
negligent performance of a duty assumed by the government for
which it is not protected by the statutory exemption.
Negligent misrepresentation has developed as a distinct cause of
action in tort and it is governed by principles of law at variance
with those rules regarding other negligent conduct. 17 Therefore the
courts frequently are confronted with the difficult problem of determining whether the rules concerning negligent acts or those concerning negligent misrepresentation should apply. The approach
taken by the court in the instant case appears proper. It would be
unsound, for example, to "invoke the [statutory] exception where
the gist of an ordinary accident case is negligence in misrepresenting
by sign, or signal, or word of mouth, a condition of danger or a
vehicle driver's intention .. .. *"18 However, as in the instant case,
the theory of the action is often more questionable and consequently
greater recognition of the problem by legal scholars is warranted.
The court's liberal construction of the National Housing Act as imposing upon the government a duty to prospective vendees seems just
in view of the significant role of the Federal Housing Administration
in real estate purchases.

INSURANCE-FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION-REGULATION
BY STATE WHERE UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICE ORIGINATES
DOES NOT OUST FTC JURISDICTION UNDER
McCARRAN ACT
The respondent, a Nebraska corporation and domiciliary, sold insurance in interstate commerce exclusively by mail from its home
office in Omaha. In answer to cease and desist proceedings by the
Federal Trade Commission1 alleging violation of section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act 2 by engaging in false and deceptive
Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 242 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1957), discussed in
note 10 supra.
16. National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 967 (1954), discussed in note 9 supra; Jones v. United States, 207
F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 921 (1954), discussed in note 8
supra.
17. See PRossEa, TORTS §§ 86-91 (2d ed. 1955). Also compare RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 311 with § 552 (1934).
18. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS, § 29.13, at 1655 (1956).
1. 53 F.T.C. 548 (1956).

2. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, as amended, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1958).
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interstate advertising practices respondent relied upon the McCarranFerguson Act, which provides that the "Federal Trade Commission
Act . . .shall be applicable to the business of insurance [only] to
the extent that such business is not regulated by state law,' 3 and
upon a Nebraska statute which prohibits unfair or deceptive insurance
practices by domiciliaries or residents in that state or "in any other
state."'4 Commissioners Anderson and Gwynne, speaking for the
Commission, rejected respondent's contention and granted a cease
and desist order which was set aside by the court of appeals 5 on
the ground that regulation by Nebraska, the state where the practice
originated, defeated FTC jurisdiction under the McCarran Act. On
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, held (6-to-3)
vacated and remanded. Regulation by the state in which the unfair
trade practice has its impact-not regulation by the state in which
the unfair trade practice originates-will oust FTC jurisdiction under
the McCarran Act. Federal Trade Commission v. Travelers Health
Association, 362 U.S. 293 (1960).
The McCarran-Ferguson Act 6 was enacted to override the decision
of the Supreme Court in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
3. The pertinent portions of the McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation

Act (often referred to as Public Law 15) are §§ 1-5, 2(a, b), 59 Stat. 34 (1945)

15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1958).

Sections 1012 (a), (b) are as follows:

"That the Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and
taxation by the several states of the business of insurance is in the public
interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed
to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the
several States.
"Sec. 2(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein,
shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.
"(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax on such business,
unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance: Provided,
That after June 30, 1948, the [Sherman] Act .... the Clayton Act, and ...
The Federal Trade Commission Act . . .shall be applicable to the business
of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law."
4. The statute provides: "No person shall engage in this state in unfair
methods of competition or in unfair or deceptive acts and practices in the
conduct of the business of insurance. No person domiciled in or resident of
this state shall engage in unfair methods of competition or in unfair or
deceptive acts and practices in the conduct of the business of insurance in
any other state, territory, possession, province, country, or district." NEB. REV.
STAT. § 44-1503 (Supp. 1959). (Italics added.)
5. Travelers Health Ass'n v. FTC, 262 F.2d 241 (8th Cir. 1959).
6. On the McCarran Act generally see, SAwYER, INSURANCE As INTERSTATE
CommERCE (1945); Chellberg, Regulation of Insurance-The State Federal
Controversy, 7 DE PAUL L. REv. 25 (1957); Chappel, Insurance Under the
McCarran-FergusonAct, 33 GEo. L.J. 321 (1945); Sawyer, Public Law 15, A

Program Under, 1946 INs. L.J. 72; Naujoks, Regulation of the Insurance
Business and Public Law No. 15, 79th Congress, First Session, 30 MARQ. L.
REv. 77 (1946); Kimball & Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate
Regulation: The McCarran-FergusonAct in Historical Perspective, 55 AICH.
L. REv. 545 (1958); McCarran, Insurance As Commerce-After Four Years,
23 Novm

DAME LAW.

299 (1948).
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Ass'n 7 by preserving state control and taxation of insurance while
at the same time assuring protection of the public interest by the
assertion of federal jurisdiction where the states failed to act.8 The
holding in Federal Trade Commission v. National Casualty Co. that
the mere existence of state legislation regardless of its effectiveness
will oust FTC jurisdiction 9 made it difficult for the Commission to
police unfair trade practices in those states that were unwilling or
unable to effectively enforce their legislation. National Casualty also
held that the McCarran Act withdraws from the FTC the authority
to regulate advertising mailed from the home office of an insurance
company to its agents for dissemination throughout the several states
in which the company is licensed, where such states have adopted
regulatory legislation applicable to advertising by insurance companies doing business therein. Certiorari was granted in the instant
case to "resolve an important question left undecided in" National
Casualty.0 In that case the state regulation that ousted federal
7. 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (indictment under the Sherman Act upheld). The
immediate effect of the holding in South-Eastern Underwritersthat insurance
was commerce, was to subject the insurance business to federal regulation
whenever it crossed state lines. South-Eastern Underwriters, for all practical purposes, overruled the holding in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)
168 (1869), that the issuance of an insurance policy was not a transaction in
commerce. Since then the statement had been repeated and broadened.
Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 654 (1895). ("The business of insurance is
not commerce.") New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S.
495, 510 (1913). ("[Cjontracts of insurance are not commerce at all, neither
state nor interstate.") See also Nutting v. Massachusetts, 183 U.S. 389 (1900);
Philadelphia Fire Ass'n v. New York, 119 U.S. 110 (1886). The cases are
collected and discussed in GAvrr, THE COMMnWERCE. CLAUSE OF Tim UNITED
STATES CoNsTruo 134-39 (1932). The Court in South-Eastern Underwriters was able to distinguish the Paul v. Virginia line of cases since they
arose under the issue of the validity of a state statute and in none of them
was the Court asked to strike down an act of Congress.
For comment on South-Eastern Underwriters, see Berke, Is the Business
of Insurance Commerce?, 57 HARv. L. REV. 937 (1944); Notes, 45 COLUM. L.
Rnv. 927 (1945), 20 IND. L. REv. 184 (1945), 29 MARQ. L. REV. 55 (1955). See
also Timberg, Insurance and Interstate Commerce, 50 YALE L.J. 959 (1941),

which preceded and predicted the result.
8. Note, Regulation of Insurance Advertising Practices:A Judicial Inquiry,
67 YALE L.J. 452, 453 (1958). It is interesting to note that the bill finally
enacted into law as the McCarran Act was prepared by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. Id. at 454, n.4.
9. 357 U.S. 560 (1958). The legislative history reveals that Senators McCarran and Ferguson were at odds on this issue. Senator McCarran felt
that only effective state legislation should preclude federal intervention.
91 CONG. REc. 1443 (1945). Senator Ferguson, however, was of the opinion
that the mere presence of state legislation should prevent federal regulation.
91 CONG. REC. 1444 (1945). In signing Public Law 15, President Roosevelt
stated his view as follows: "After the moratorium period, the Anti-trust
laws and certain related statutes will be applicable in full force and effect
to the business of insurance except to the extent that the states have assumed
the responsibility, and are effectively performing that responsibility for the
regulation of whatever aspect of the insurance business may be involved."
Maloney, Federal Regulation of Insurance, 1960 INS. L.J. 363, 365. (Italics
added.)
10. 362 U.S. at 297.
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jurisdiction was regulation by the state in which the deception had
its impact. In the instant case the Nebraska statute attempts to
regulate extraterritorially by referring to practices in other states.
The Unfair Trade Practices Act," upon which the Nebraska statute
is modeled, was designed to provide state regulation of insurance
and thus prevent application of the federal anti-trust laws. It has,
with minor variations, been enacted in all fifty states.
In the principal case Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,
reasoned that a single state's attempted regulation of a domiciliary's
extraterritorial activities is not the type of state regulation referred to
in the McCarran Act since it deprives the residents of every other
state of the protection of the Federal Trade Commission Act.' 2 The
Court drew upon the legislative history of the McCarran Act,13 and
11. This act, prepared by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, was enacted by the states in accordance with the intent of Congress which is evidenced by the inclusion of the moratorium provision. The
second sentence of the Nebraska statute relating to the extraterritorial con-

trol over domiciliary companies was not a part of the original enactment
but was enacted in 1957 after the ruling of the FTC in the instant case. The
apparent purpose of inserting this provision was to test the constitutionality of
such extraterritorial regulation. The Court, however, declined to pass on the
constitutional question. 362 U.S. at 302.
12. 362 U.S. at 297, 298. Judge Vogal, dissenting in the case when it was
before the court of appeals, had also reasoned that it was "impractical and
ineffective" to "force the citizens of other states to rely upon Nebraska's
regulation ....
"262 F.2d 241, 245 (8th Cir. 1959).
13. The sole discussion of section 2(b), the focal point of the act in the
instant case, occurred in the Senate debate. Since the proviso was added in
conference neither the Committee Reports nor any of the earlier history deals
with it. The Conference Report (91 CONG. REc. 1357) does not comment on
the proviso and the House approved the Report without debate. 91 CONG.
REc. 1395-96.

The legislative history referred to by the majority as "specific legislative
history," 362 U.S. at 301, is labeled "fragmentary" and "meagre" by the
dissent. 362 U.S. at 303, 304.
The majority places great reliance upon the report on the original House
bill which stated, in part: "[W]e should provide for the continued regulation
and taxation of insurance by the States, subject always, however, to the
limitations set out in the controlling decisions of the United States Supreme
Court . . . ." The report then cites Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v.
Johnson, 333 U.S. 77 (1938); St. Louis Cotton Express Co. v. Arkansas, 260
U.S. 346 (1922); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), and states their
holding to be "that a State does not have power to tax contracts of insurance or reinsurance entered into outside its jurisdiction by individuals or
corporations resident or domiciled therein covering risks within the State
or to regulate such transactions in any way." This statement of the holdings is broad and misleading. The St. Louis Cotton Express and Allegeyer
cases involved the attempted regulation by the state of a foreign corporation and Connecticut General Life involved a tax by a state on reinsurance
premiums collected by a resident, not a domiciliary, on contracts entered
into in another state. In the instant case Nebraska is the incorporating
state and the state of domicile. Any analogy is elusive. The dissent accurately dispenses with this report as being directed not to the kinds of
state insurance regulation which would exempt the insurance business from
federal regulation, but to the general proposition that the McCarran Act
would not broaden or narrow the states' regulatory power as it existed prior
to South-EasternUnderwriters.
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a "basic motivating policy behind the legislative movement"'14 to
support its conclusion. The Court reserved judgment on the constitutionality of the Nebraska statute15 and on the effect of regulation
by the states to which the respondent's advertising was sent. 16 The
14. This policy appears to be inherent in one of the major arguments of the
proponents of state regulation, namely, that the states are in a close proximity
to the people affected by insurance and thus better able to regulate the
business than the federal government.
15. The only extended discussion of the constitutional question in the
instant case is found in the concurring opinion by Chairman Gwynne of
the Federal Trade Commission. 53 FTC 548, 558 (1956). Chairman Gwynne,
of course, was not construing the effect of the Emergency Act, which was
not added until 1957, but he reasoned that even if the statute could be
construed to operate in other states there is grave doubt as to its constitutionality. Gwynne was of the opinion that in all statutes that may be
said to reach across state lines there is inherent therein the basic purpose
to protect the rights of the citizens of the state passing the law and that
even then the right sought to be protected must be weighed against the
rights of the other states and their citizens with the outcome involving an
application of the due process clause and dependent on the individual facts
of each case. Watson v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954);
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935); Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1909); Parmalee v. Iowa State
Traveling Men's Ass'n, 206 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1953); Parmalee v. Commercial
Traveling Mut. Acc. Ass'n of America, 206 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1953) are cited to
support this position, which is in effect a distinction of these cases on the basis
of local interest. Whatever analogy may be drawn from the rest of the cases
it is difficult to see how Hammond Packing supports Chairman Gwynne's
position. The dissent in the Supreme Court points it out in support of their
position that the Nebraska statute is unconstitutional and Gwynne cites it
as an example of constitutionality based on local interest, i.e., protection of
citizens of the enacting state. The statute in Hammond Packing forbade
a corporation from continuing to do business within the state after it had
done, either within or without the state, certain enumerated acts. It is
difficult to see any more local interest in Hammond Packing than in the
instant case.
16. The question of whether legislation by the states in which this deception
was practiced is within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is now
pending before the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Travelers
Health Ass'n v. Federal Trade Commission, Civil No. 15,743. In view of the
Supreme Court's decision in this case coupled with the holding in National
Casualty that it is the presence of legislation and not its effectiveness that
is the controlling factor, it is difficult to see how the court can sustain
the Commission's jurisdiction. A close examination of the state regulations,
however, reveals that they are dangerously inadequate.
The Model Fair Trade Practices Act, now enacted in all 50 states and
Puerto Rico, provides that violation of cease and desist orders shall be
punished by a civil penalty of not more than five hundred dollars for each
violation. (This amount varies, however.) Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia
insures jurisdiction over foreign mail order insurance companies. Notice may
be given under the Uniform Unauthorized Insurers Service of Process Act
which has been enacted in forty-five states, the District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico. Its constitutionality was upheld in Parmalee v. Iowa State
Traveling Men's Ass'n, 206 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1953). This act provides for
the appointment of an agent within the state for service of process with
respect to the transaction of any insurance business, mail or otherwise.
Service by registered mail would also seem to be appropriate means of
giving notice of cease and desist proceedings to an out-of-state mail order
insurance company. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950)
(service by registered mail held sufficient).
After giving notice by one of the above means the state would be squarely
faced with the problem of enforcement. How can State A enforce its cease
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entire decision is thus focused upon the meaning of the words "regulated by State Law" in section 2(b) of the McCarran Act to which
the Court gives a limited construction. This limited construction is
attacked by the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan which states that
the majority is innovating with respect to the McCarran Act and
17
invading the realm of congressional concern.
The holding in National Casualty, that the enactment of legislation
by the state, regardless of effective enforcement, determines federal
exemption, created a vacuum between the exercise of federal power
and effective state regulation. The holding in the instant case has
enlarged that vacuum by failing to give effect to the regulatory laws
of the state of domicile where jurisdiction over the insurance company is readily obtainable and enforcement of its laws over its
domiciliaries easily effectuated. This may at first blush appear to
offer a more satisfactory solution by providing uniformity and efficacy of federal control; but when considered in the light of National
Casualty, Justice Stewart's opinion does not provide a basis for
uniform federal jurisdiction. It boils down to a choice between traditional state control 18 and effective control. If the domiciliary state
is to be precluded from regulating extraterritorially the advertising
and desist order and civil penalty against a citizen of State B? State A

could, as is suggested in Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, garnish the
local policyholders. This is ineffective, however, since the policyholders can
cancel their policies at any time and cease paying the premiums. They are
not indebted to the insurance company. Another possibility would be suit by
State A in State B upon A's statute. No case can be found to maintain this
unless State A's claim to the civil penalty is first reduced to judgment in
State A. Then, and only then, can an analogy be found to maintain the suit.
This analogy is found in Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268
(1935). In that case the Supreme Court required Illinois to give full faith
and credit to a Wisconsin tax judgment against an Illinois corporation. It
is arguable that since tax judgments are entitled to full faith and credit, a
fortiori civil penalty judgments founded upon the Fair Trade Practices Act,
an area in which there is a much higher degree of unity of public policy
among the states, would be entitled to full faith and credit. Yet, even if
the analogy were sustained it is apparent that this method of enforcement is
cumbersome and far from ideal.
Thus it would appear that, unfortunately, there is enough state legislation
in this area to oust the Federal Trade Commission's jurisdiction under National Casualty, but, as is pointed out above, the actual effectiveness in fact
of this legislation leaves much to be desired.
17. Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker joined in the dissent. 362 U.S. at
303.
18. State regulation of insurance often results in the state having the
more stringent laws setting the standard for the entire industry. For
example, the insurance companies licensed in New York hold approximately
eighty-three per cent of the total assets owned by all United States insurance
companies. Comment, The ExtraterritorialEffect of Insurance Regulation,
With ParticularEmphasis on New York, 58 McH. L. Rv. 558, 561 (1960).
New York regulates its licensed insurance companies in many out of state
transactions with which it has no contact, e.g., investment practices, amount
of coverage in any given year. Id. at 568. Since the New York regulations
are more stringent than those of any other state the result is centralized
control over much of the life insurance business. Id. at 561.
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practices of its mail order insurance companies no effective control
of these practices can be had, since no amount of regulation by
another state can, as a practical matter, control the influx of deceptive advertising material from the state of domicile. Yet, in view of
National Casualty, the federal government is still precluded by the
existence of legislation in the state of impact. Moreover the insurance
industry has devised uniform acts, full faith and credit arguments
and the like which are designed to meet the formal requirements of
National Casualty and continue this result. It is therefore submitted
that as long as the decision in National Casualty and Travelers
Health stand, the deceptive interstate practices of insurance companies cannot be effectively controlled.

LABOR LAW-NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT-CONTROVERSY
OVER ABOLITION OF JOBS IS A LABOR DISPUTE
Respondent railroad, upon petition to two state regulatory commissions, received permission to abolish several one-man stations.1
Petitioner labor union, contending that respondent's program conflicted with existing agreements, issued a strike call. The federal
district court issued a temporary injunction against the striking
union but refused permanent injunctive relief. 2 The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for entry of a permanent injunction on the ground that the union proposal did not raise a "labor
dispute" 3 within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 4 so as to
bar injunctive relief.5 On certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
United States, held (5-to-4), reversed. A controversy concerning the
1. Respondent planned to consolidate the stations into one centralized
agency as an economy move.
2. Chicago & N.W.Ry. v. Order of R.R. Telegraphers, 36 CCH Lab. Cas.
65367 (N.D. Ill. 1958). The district court did enjoin the union from striking
for a thirty-day period dating from termination of emergency mediation,
basing its decision on a literal interpretation of § 5(1) of the Railway
Labor Act, 48 Stat. 1195 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 155(1) (1958), providing a
thirty-day cooling-off period in the event of voluntary or emergency mediation.
3. The relevant part of § 13(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act defines a
labor dispute as:
"Any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or
concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiation,
fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions
of employment .... ." 47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1958).
4. Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides "no court of the United
States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary
injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute ....
47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
5. Chicago & N.W.Ry. v. Order of R.R. Telegraphers, 264 F.2d 254 (7th
Cir. 1960).
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abolition of existing jobs by an employer is a "labor dispute"
within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Order of R.R.
Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed by Congress to remove from
the federal courts the power to determine the validity of particular
labor union objectives and methods except under strictly limited
conditions. The uniqueness of its negative approach to the problem
of labor-management relations is apparent when it is realized that
all subsequent labor legislation has taken an affirmative approach.
The act's effect has been to leave labor unions free to carry on,
unhindered by the issuance of injunctions by the federal courts, all
non-violent activities (not made illegal by Taft-Hartley) deemed
necessary to their economic program. 6 Since the earlier attempt to
limit the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes through section
20 of the Clayton Act 7 had failed to afford the expected protection
from judicial interference,8 care was taken to state in broad terms
the definition of "labor dispute" as indicating the scope of the subject matter of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to prevent a similar failure.
The prodigious increase in the power of organized labor, resulting in
an extensive growth in the subject matter of collective bargaining, 9
6. GREGORY, LABOR AND T=E LAW 184-93

(rev. ed. 1958).

7. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1958). "That no restraining order
or injunction shall be granted . . . in any case between an employer and
employees . . . involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or
conditions of employment ...

."

In Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254

U.S. 443 (1920), the Supreme Court held that the inhibitions of § 20 only
applied to those occupying the position of employer and employee and no
others. Holmes, Brandeis and Clarke dissented vigorously.
8. "The underlying aim of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was to restore the
broad purpose which Congress thought it had formulated but which was
frustrated, so Congress believed, by unduly restrictive judicial construction."
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 235-36 (1940); see Marine Cooks
v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 369 (1960). The congressional purpose was
prompted by a desire to protect the rights of laboring men to organize and
bargain collectively and to withdraw federal courts from a type of controversy for which many believed they were ill-suited and from participation
in which, it was feared, judicial prestige might suffer. FRANKFURTER &
GREENE, THE LABOR INJ1uNcIoN 200 (1930); Gregory, op. cit. supra, at 184-99.
For discussions of the legislative background and congressional intent, see
Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 329 (1938); New Negro Alliance v.
Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938); Donnelly Garment Co. v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 99 F.2d 309 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied 305 U.S. 62 (1938) (a leading interpretation grounded on the legislative history of the act); Milk Wagon Drivers' Union Local 753 v. Lake
Valley Farm Prods., 311 U.S. 91 (1940).
9. In a case arising under the National Labor Relations Act, the Supreme
Court held that it was not per se an "unfair labor practice" for the employees to bargain for inclusion in a collective bargaining agreement of a
"management functions" clause: "The extent of union and management
participation in the administration of such matter is itself a condition of
employment to be settled by bargaining." NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins.
Co., 343 U.S. 395, 409 (1952). On the scope of the obligation to bargain, see
also Richfield Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (employee
stock purchase plans); Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948),
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has concurred with the broad statutory definition of "labor dispute"
to produce an enlarged construction of that term. 0 In interpreting
the meaning of "labor dispute" the courts have held that while it
must concern matters "which are vital to the welfare of the laboring man,"1 1 the fact that the dispute is with an organization of
persons not employees is immaterial.12 The objective of the union
has also been held immaterial if the controversy involves terms and
conditions of employment; 13 and this is true even though a violation
of the Sherman or Clayton Acts is alleged, 14 or the act in question
is an interference with foreign commerce.15 Other instances include
disputes which on their merits may be resolved or determined by
reference to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; 16 a suit
by the union for specific performance of an arbitration clause in a
collective bargaining agreement; 17 an agreement by the employer
to recognize one of two competing unions; 18 and a union's attempt
cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949) (pension programs); Weyerhauser Timber
Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 672 (1949) (meals).
10. Several states have enacted legislation patterned after the NorrisLaGuardia Act, 2 TELLER, LABOR DIsPUTEs AND COLLECTIVE BARGAIMNG § 434
(1940), and the definition of "labor dispute" in these statutes is similar
to or identical with § 13(c). See, e.g., 30 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 701(8), defining
"labor dispute" as "any controversy . . . concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment . . . ." Segal v. Selvey, 189 Misc. 551, 72 N.Y.S.2d
341 (1947), stated in regard to this section:
"[O]ur courts have jealously .guarded the purpose and interest of the
legislature in outlawing injunctions in labor disputes. . . . [In no
event should the courts, by straining at the facts or by narrow interpretation of the statute, nullify or whittle away what the legislature has
plainly declared to be the public policy of this state." Id. at 344.
Accord, Ardita v. Bright, 129 N.Y.S.2d 788 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Goldfinger v.
Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E.2d 911 (1937).
11. Donnelly Garment Co. v. International Ladies Garment Workers
Union, 20 F. Supp. 767, 772 (W.D. Mo. 1937).
12. Aetna Freight Lines v. Clayton, 228 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1955). Accord,
United Elec. Cos. v. Rice, 80 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1935).
13. Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821 (1945).
14. United States v. Hutcheson, supra note 8; Milk Wagon Drivers' Union
Local 754 v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., supra note 8.
15. Marine Cooks v. Panama S.S. Co., supra note 8, reversing 265 F.2d 780
(9th Cir. 1959). The Court noted that petitioners were picketing on their
own behalf, distinguishing Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138
(1957).
16. W. L. Mead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 217 F.2d 6 (1st Cir.
1954). Accord, In re Third Ave. Transit Corp., 192 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1951).
17. Local 19 v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co., 236 F.2d 776 (6th Cir. 1956).
Accord, on conclusion as to applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Local
205 v. General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1956). Contra, United Steelworkers of America v. Gaillard-Henning Mfg. Co., 139 F. Supp. 630 (E.D.
Wis. 1956); Alcoa S.S. Co. v. McMahon, 173 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1949).
18. Wilson Employees' Representative Plan v. Wilson & Co., 53 F. Supp. 23
(S.D. Calif. 1943); see R. G. Johnson Co. v. Marchiando, 184 F.2d 337 (7th
Cir. 1950). Compare Bakery Drivers Union v. Wagshal, 333 U.S. 437 (1948)
(failure of petitioner's employer and his customer to agree on time of delivery and amount of bill not a labor dispute); Union Premier Food Stores
v. Retail Food Clerks Union, 98 F.2d 821 (3d Cir. 1938) (no labor dispute
where employer refused to recognize either of competing unions and took no
part in difficulty, but agreed to abide by decision of NLRB).
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to induce architects and general contractors to let no sub-contracts
to an employers' association favoring open shop. 19 Recent cases involving the transportation industry have recognized the increased
scope of collective bargaining, but an injunction has been issued to
the employer or denied to the union on the basis of provisions in
the Railway Labor Act for mediation.20 These include cases where
an employer closed one of his yards;2 ' where an employer established
a new reporting point for workers;22 where the purpose of the injunction was to proscribe a threatened violation of the Railway Labor
Act;2 3 where ten employees were fired due to changes in train
schedules; 24 abolishment of the position of one worker; 25 and abolishment of seventeen unnecessary positions. 26
The instant case is concerned with reconciling the anti-injunction
provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 2 7 with the mediation provisions of the Railway Labor Act. 28 The court of appeals, faced with
this problem, held that no bargainable issue under sections 4 and
13(c) was raised, on the ground that the union's proposal represented "an attempt to usurp legitimate management prerogative in
the exercise of business judgment," 29 and that the Norris-LaGuardia
Act was therefore inapplicable. The majority of the Supreme Court,
however, found that "plainly" the controversy was a "labor dispute"
under 13(c) 30 basing their decision on the present state of subjects
for collective bargaining 3' and the broadening of the scope of negotiation.32 Dismissed summarily was the contention that the con19. Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 71 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1934).
20. 48 Stat. 1187-97 (1934), 45 U.S.C. §§ 153-57 (1958). The details of
the mediation provisions of the act are discussed in note 33 infra.
21. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. New York Cent. R.R., 246 F.2d 114
(6th Cir. 1957).
22. Norfolk & B.L.R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 248 F.2d 34 (4th
Cir. 1957).
23. Missouri-K-T R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 266 F.2d 335
(5th Cir. 1959) ("minor dispute"), rev'd, 363 U.S. 528 (1960) (union entitled
to injunction to preserve jurisdiction of National Railway Arbitration Board
over the dispute). This decision would appear to overrule Brotherhood
of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I.R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
24. Ibid.
25. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Local 2013, United Railroad Workers, 178 F. Supp.
53 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
26. In re Hudson & Manhattan R.R., 172 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 267

F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 928 (1960).
27. Supra note 4.
28. Supra note 20.
29. 264 F.2d at 259.
30. 362 U.S. at 336.
31. "And, in the collective bargaining world today, there is nothing
strange about agreements that affect the permanency of employment." 362
U.S. at 336.
32. "The trend of legislation affecting railroads and railroad employees has
been to broaden, not to narrow, the scope of subjects about which workers
and railroads may or must negotiate and bargain collectively." Citing
previous "practices and customs" of the railroads, the Court stated that "it
is too late now to argue that employees can have no collective voice to
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troversy was a "minor dispute" enjoinable to enforce compliance
with procedures established under the Railway Labor Act.33 The
four dissenting justices argued vigorously that: (1) the intent of
Congress as expressed in legislation regulating the railroad industry
was to promote economic and efficient transportation, but the majority decision would make such promotion impossible; 34 (2) that
petitioner's conduct was unlawful and therefore enjoinable. 35 It
should be noted that while the majority opinion is concerned with
determining whether a "labor dispute" exists, the dissenting opinion
emphasizes the merits of the parties' positions.
The decision in the instant case seems to be reasonably within the
scope of "labor dispute," in view of the aforementioned congressional
intent and previous negotiations by the parties to the case. 36 The
majority opinion is consistent with the philosophy of the NorrisLaGuardia Act that the judicial arm of the federal government should
leave labor and management free to bargain and in so doing to apply
the degree of economic pressure permitted by the act to secure
resolution of differences. The dissenting opinions, however, show
very plainly that the problem existing in cases such as the instant
one cannot be solved by the bland refusal of an injunction on the
ground of the existence of a labor dispute, for if the processes of
collective bargaining within the framework for settlement provided
in the Railway Labor Act then fail to produce agreement, the result will be a legal vacuum. Perhaps the answer to this problem of
the increasing automation of the economy, and the resulting disinfluence railroads to act in a way that will preserve the interests of the
employees as well as the interests of the railroads and the public at large."
Id. at 338.
33. "It is impossible to classify as a minor dispute this dispute relating to
a major charge, affecting jobs ... rather than mere infractions or interpretations of the ... agreement." Id. at 341. The Railway Labor Act differentiates

between "major" and "minor" disputes, the former being controversies over
the formation or amendment of collective agreements, the latter controversies
over the interpretation of an agreement already concluded. Elgin, J. & E.
Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945). Major disputes are to be settled
through mediation and voluntary arbitration and perhaps the appointment
of a Presidential Emergency Board while minor disputes are to be decided
by the National Railway Adjustment Board, if submitted by one of the
parties. 48 Stat. 1189-97 (1934), 45 U.S.C. §§ 153-55 (1952). Since both
parties declined arbitration, 362 U.S. at 350, nothing in the Railway Labor
Act forbade petitioner's strike, for arbitration is not mandatory. Brotherhood
of R.R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W.R.R., 321 U.S. 50 (1944). Even if the
controversy had been a '"minor dispute," no injunction would issue unless
the National Railway Adjustment Board procedure had been invoked,
Marion v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 353 U.S. 927 (1957) (per curiam), and
this was not done.
34. Id. at 344, 355-56.
35. Id. at 360.
36. Supra note 30. Comment, 12 STAN. L. REV. 235 (1959), a review of the
circuit court's holding, agrees with the reasoning of the Supreme Court. For
the opposite view, see O'Shaughnessy, The Long Step-Into the Unknown, 11
LAB. L.J. 699 (1960).
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placement of the human element therein,3 7 is industry-by-industry
planning to re-train and re-settle marginal workers displaced by
automation, or creation of a federal instrumentality of the same
nature. 38 But conditions precedent to the availability of this means
for resolving the dispute should be such as to insure that neither
party would look upon such a plan as a substitute for collective
bargaining.

LABOR LAW-STATE QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR
UNION OFFICERS NOT PRE-EMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW IF
APPLIED FOR A PURPOSE EXPRESSLY APPROVED BY
CONGRESS
Plaintiff, a union official,' sought a declaratory judgment from
the supreme court of New York regarding the constitutionality of a
section of the New York Waterfront Commission Act 2 which provides that no person shall solicit or receive any dues on behalf of
a waterfront union if any officer of such union has been convicted
of a felony, unless he has been subsequently pardoned or has received
a certificate of good conduct.3 Prior to becoming a union official
plaintiff had pleaded guilty to grand larceny, for which cause defendant, district attorney, threatened to invoke the New York act.
37. General discussions on this problem are found in Aaron, Governmental
Restraints on Featherbedding,5 STAN. L. REv. 680 (1953); Brown, Employee
Protection and the Regulation of Public Utilities: Mergers, Consolidations,
and Abandonment of Facilities in the TransportationIndustry, 63 YALE L.J.
445 (1954); Reuther, Labor's Stake, in THE CHALLENGE OF AUTOMATION (1955).
Two recent cases, both involving the railroad industry, show that the problem is rapidly coming to a head. The first case concerned the merger of the
Erie and the Lackawanna railroads, discussed in the Wall Street Journal,
October 13, 1960, p. 3, col. 2; the second concerned the seizure of the Rutland Railway by the State of Vermont, discussed in the Wall Street Journal,
October 27, 1960, p. 13, col. 1.

38. For a proposal of this nature, see Wright, For Subsidies That Make
Sense, in The Reporter, September 29, 1960, p. 29. Such action would possibly forestall the passage of legislation (S.3548) proposed by Senator Everett
Dirksen (R. Ill.) on May 13, 1960, to remove from the list of compulsory
bargaining subjects "The creation or discontinuance of positions."
The President has appointed a commission to study the railroad work
rules dispute and make recommendations, not to be binding, for its solution
on or before December 1, 1961. 1 LAE. REL. REP. (46 Anal.) 101 (Oct. 24,
1960).
1. Plaintiff was Secretary-Treasurer of Local 1346, International Longshoremen's Association in New York. De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 145
(1960).
2. N.Y. Laws 1953, cc. 882-83; N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 6700ww (McKinney
1953). This statute is a part of the implementing legislation for a compact
between New York and New Jersey.
3. New York Waterfront Commission Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 6700ww
(8) (McKinney 1953).
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Plaintiff was suspended by the union, whereupon the instant suit
4
Plaintiff contended that the act conflicts with the
was brought.
"supremacy ' '5 clause of the United States Constitution by attempting
to regulate a field already occupied by federal regulation. The
court's action dismissing the complaint was affirmed by the supreme
court, appellate division, and the court of appeals. On appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed. A state's qualification
requirements for union officers, if applied for a purpose expressly
approved by Congress, are not pre-empted by federal law. De Veau
v. Braisted,363 U.S. 144 (1960).
Local governments, in their efforts to provide qualification standards applicable to union officials representing employees in interstate
commerce, are confronted by the question of whether they are acting
within their constitutionally established domain of power or are
attempting to regulate a field so occupied by federal law as to be preempted therefrom. Pre-emption may rest on either of two bases: (1)
There may be an obvious overlapping of federal and state laws on a
subject" or, (2) federal law may so generally occupy the field that
local law therein would interfere with the administration thereof.
The instant case is mainly concerned with the latter type of preemption. State statutory regulations of union officials are generally
couched in terms of "registration" or "licensing" with those of New
4. Plaintiff also asked for an injunction restraining the operation of the
act. 363 U.S. at 145.
5. Plaintiff's supremacy contention is based on the following reasoning:
The National Labor Relations Act sets the federal policy of allowing
workers to designate representatives of their own choice to bargain in
their behalf, but since the New York act denies the choice of an ex-felon
it is contrary to federal law in a field where federal law is supreme, and
therefore invalid. 363 U.S. at 152. See National Labor Relations Act, 49
Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157 (1958). Also in this
vein, plaintiff contends that since Congress itself has placed restrictions on
the choice of union officers any state statute imposing the same type of
restriction is pre-empted. 363 U.S. at 156. For Congressional restrictions,
see Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519,
29 U.S.C. § 504(a) (Supp. I, 1959).
6. Plaintiff also contended that the New York Act denies "due process,"
based on the argument that it is not a reasonable means for achieving the
legitimate state aim of eliminating corruption on the waterfront. 363 U.S.
at 157. He also charged the act was a bill of attainder and an ex post facto
law. The Court dismisses these contentions very summarily as having no
basis. 363 U.S. at 160.
7. This question is involved in this case and seems to be adequately disposed of by the statement that "this is not a situation where the operation
of a state statute so obviously contradicts a federal enactment that it would
preclude both from functioning together or, at least, would impede the
effectiveness of the federal measure." 363 U.S. at 152.
8. See CIO v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 65 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1946);
Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51 (D. Kan.), appeal dismissed sub nom.
McElroy v. Mitchell, 326 U.S. 690 (1945); Coutlakis v. State, 268 S.W.2d
192 (Tex. Crim. App. 1954); AFL v. Mann, 188 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App.
1945); Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 237
Wis. 164, 295 N.W. 791, afj'd, 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
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York,9 New Jersey, 1 Florida," Texas, 12 and Kansas 3 specifically
providing restrictive qualifications for union officials. The purposes
of such state regulatory statutes are to regulate the impact of labor
union activities on local conditions, 14 to protect those to whom union
officials are fiduciaries, 5 to help law enforcement agencies in fixing
responsibility for public disturbances arising out of union activities, 16
7
and to exercise the state's right to protect generally its citizens.'
For the same purposes, cities have also attempted to provide regulation in this field' 8 and have faced the same constitutional problems
as have the states. 19 In this field, Congress has passed the National
Labor Relations Act, which provides for freedom of choice of collective bargaining representatives by employees, 20 and the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act, which disqualifies
ex-felons from holding union office unless certain conditions are
complied with.2 ' The application of the Florida statute was held
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Hill v. Floridaz2 because
it interfered with the federal policy of allowing full freedom to
employees in selecting their bargaining representatives as set out
in the Wagner Act.2 In the Hill case, the Court made clear that it
was not its intention to curtail the state's traditional regulatory
power,2 4 but that it thought the determination of qualifications for
9. New York denies office to ex-felons not having been pardoned nor
having obtained a certificate of good conduct. See note 2 supra.
10. New Jersey denies office to ex-felons not having been pardoned nor
having obtained a certificate of good conduct. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:23-1 to
32:23-98 (Supp. 1959).
11. Florida requires a business agent of a union to be a citizen and
resident of the United States for ten years, to be of good moral character
and not an ex-felon. FLA. STAT. ANNi. § 477.04 (1952). See Katz, Two
Decades of State Labor Legislation; 1937-1957, 25 U. Cmi. L. Ray. 109 (1957).
12. Texas forbids an alien or ex-felon, unless his rights have been restored,
to be an officer or organizer of a union. TEx. REV. Cxv. STAT. ANN. art. 5154a

(4) (a) (1948).
13. Kansas requires union business agents to be United States citizens.
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 44-804 (1949).
14. AFL v. Mann, 188 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
15. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
16. 12 U. FLA. L. REv. 465 (1959).
17. 60 W. VA. L. REV. 272, 275 (1958).
18. "The greatest activity in the licensing field is now found not at the
state but at the county and municipal level and almost all in the South."
Katz, supra note 11, at 131.
19. See Denton v. City of Carrollton, 235 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1956); Pittman
v. Nix, 152 Fla. 378, 11 So. 2d 791 (1943); Staub v. City of Baxley, 94 Ga.
App. 18, 93 S.E.2d 375, rev'd, 355 U.S. 313 (1958).
20. 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157 (1958).
21. 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. § 504(a) (Supp. I 1959).
22. 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
23. "The Court reasoned that since the Florida statute prevented the
union and its selected representative from functioning as collective bargaining agents except upon conditions fixed by Florida, the state law interfered with the full freedom of employees under the Wagner Act to
select bargaining representatives of their own choosing." Katz, Two Decades
of State Labor Legislation 1937-1957, 25 U. C i. L. REV. 109, 130 (1957).
24. 325 U.S. at 539.
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union agents was not within state power since it interfered with
federal regulation. 25 The test in the Hill case for determining if
there was federal pre-emption seemed to be whether the state act
was applied so as to frustrate the congressional purpose in the
Wagner Act of assuring freedom to union members in choosing
their bargaining representatives.2 6
The Court in the instant case recognized the Hill test 27 but re-

jected the contention that the New York statute interfered with administration of federal policy adopted in the National Labor Relations Act. The basis for this decision was the congressional approval
of a compact between New York and New Jersey. Although the
statutory regulation of officials was not specifically included in the
compact, it was brought to the attention of Congress as prospective
implementing legislation. Congress gave express consent to such implementing legislation when it approved the compact. 28 The Court
determined that there cannot be a frustration of federal policy by
legislation Congress has approved.29 The instant case does not
expressly overrule the Hill decision. 30 The Court distinguishes that
case on the ground that there was no congressional approval of the
legislation in the Hill case. The question must be raised, however,
as to the effect of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act, passed since the Hill decision, on a state's right to regulate
union officials. In the instant case, contrary to plaintiff's contention, 31
the Court interpreted the act as expressly disclaiming any intention
to fully occupy the field of regulating union officials, 32 and as saying
that since Congress has imposed such restrictions, state restrictions
would not be incompatible to federal labor policies.3 Such an interpretation could indicate that Congress intends for the regulation
of qualifications for union office holders to be within the state and
local regulatory power. 34
This decision may supercede the Hill case, in that it may show a
congressional purpose not to include freedom from state regulation
of union officers as a freedom guaranteed by the Wagner Act. The
Id. at 541.
Id. at 542.
363 U.S. at 153.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 151-55.
There may still be some question as to exactly how far the Court
went in striking down the Florida statute since the Attorney General of
Florida recognized the Court's decision only in so far as it pertained to the
removal of statutory restrictions imposed on bargaining representatives. See
12 U. FLA. L. Ray. 465, 470-71 (1959).
31. Supra note 5.
32. 363 U.S. at 156-57.
33. Id. at 156.
34. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519,
29 U.S.C. §§ 523 (a), 524 (Supp. I, 1959).
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
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instant case probably will not affect the Hill decision, however,
because it deals with a fact situation which never before confronted
the Court.35 The crime and corruption that existed on the New York
waterfront as found by investigations of Congress and New York
State 36 demanded drastic legislation. The decision in the instant
case indicates a recognition of the need and encourages cooperative
action at all levels of government, 37 while at the same time keeping
the federal system in proper perspective. It is doubtful that future
decisions will allow states more freedom of action but it is predicted
that state and local governments will become more effective in their
sphere of control as it becomes more precisely defined.

LIENS-FEDERAL TAX LIENS-STATE LAW ADOPTED AS
FEDERAL LAW TO GOVERN DIVESTITURE EXCEPT TO
EXTENT THAT CONGRESS HAS ENTERED THE FIELD
Respondents, mortgagees of Pennsylvania real property on which
the United States held a junior federal tax lien, obtained an in
personam judgment against the mortgagor-taxpayer under a confession-of-judgment provision of the mortgage bond. Pursuant to the
judgment the property was sold under a writ of fleri facias. Pennsylvania law provides that a sale under a writ of fieri facias is a judicial
sale which has the effect of extinguishing junior liens even though
their holders are not required to be made parties to the proceedings.'
The United States, having not been made a party to the Pennsylvania
proceedings, instituted suit 2 for enforcement of its lien by foreclosure
4
and sale. The court of appeals 3 affirmed the district court's decision
that the government's lien had been effectively extinguished. On
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed. State
35. "Congress expressly gave its consent to such implementing legislation.
. . . This provision in the consent by Congress to a compact is so extraordinary as to be unique in the history of compacts." 363 U.S. at 155.
36. Id. at 147-50.
37. Concerning the idea of cooperation between Federal and State governments in modern legislation, Corwin says: "By the cooperative conception of
the federal relationship the States and the National Government are regarded as mutually complementary parts of a single governmental mechanism
all of whose powers are intended to realize the current purposes of government according to their applicability to the problem in hand." Corwin,
Introduction to CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ANNOTATED
xiv (Corwin ed. 1952).
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2447 (1951); Liss v. Medary Homes, Inc., 388
Pa. 139, 130 A.2d 137 (1957).
2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7403 (action to enforce lien or to subject
property to payment of tax).
3. United States v. Brosnan, 264 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1959).
4. United States v. Brosnan, 164 F. Supp. 357 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
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law governing the divestiture of federal tax liens is to be adopted as
federal law except to the extent that Congress has entered the field.5
United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237 (1960).
The initial question to be decided by the Court was whether the
legislation enacted by Congress represented exclusive procedures for
the removal of a federal tax lien. The following statutes were pertinent to the decision: authorization of suit by a prior lienor to enforce
his lien against the United States subject to the exhaustion of certain administrative remedies; 6 authorization to name the United
States a party in any action by a private lienor to foreclose a mortgage or lien or to quiet title to property on which the United States
claims a mortgage or lien;7 and authorization to a private lienor to
apply to the Secretary of the Treasury for the release of a government lien or a partial discharge of the encumbered property. 8 The
Court held that "these statutes on their face evidence no intent to
exclude otherwise available state procedures. Their only apparent
purpose is to lift the bar of sovereign immunity which had theretofore been considered to work a particular injustice on private
lienors."9 In contrast the minority presented a convincing argument
for the proposition that the statutes presented the only methods by
which a federal tax lien could be removed. However, both the
majority and the minority agreed that if the statutory remedies were
not exclusive, matters affecting the nature of the government's tax
5. A companion case, Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. United
States, 363 U.S. 237 (1960), arose in California on substantially the same
facts. The only material difference between the two cases was that in the
Pennsylvania case the federal tax lien was extinguished by a judicial sale
under a writ of fieri facias, whereas in the California case the federal lien
was extinguished by a private sale as a result of a power-of-sale provision
in the mortgage instrument. It would seem that this would be an important
distinction in that Congress has provided a comprehensive pattern of legislation in regard to the removal of a federal tax lien in a judicial proceeding.
However, the majority surmounted this problem by stating that the "Pennsylvania procedure should not be considered as being an unconsented suit
against the United States, any more than the wholly private proceeding in
the California case. In both cases, the practical effect upon junior liens is
exactly the same." 363 U.S. at 251. This reasoning was criticized by the
minority as a "bootstrap operation." 363 U.S. at 254.
6. INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 7424. This statute requires a prior lienor to
make a written request to the Secretary of the Treasury to authorize the
filing of suit. If the Secretary fails to grant permission within six months,
the prior lienor may petition the district court for the district in which
the property is located.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (1958). Suit may be brought in the state courts but is removable to the federal courts. If the proceedings result in a judicial sale,
the United States is given one year to redeem.
8. INT. REV.CODE OF 1954, § 6325.
9. 363 U.S. at 246. The particular injustice referred to was that many
state statutes required that junior lienors be joined as parties to any
foreclosure suits. Therefore, prior to the enactment of the statutes removing
the bar of sovereign immunity, a private lienor could not obtain a judicial
decree extinguishing the government's lien.
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liens are federal questions to be determined by federal law. 0 It is
the purpose of this comment to analyze the Court's decision to adopt
state law as federal law rather than to formulate a uniform federal
rule.
On a few occasions Congress has specifically made the choice as
to the applicable federal law either by specifying the adoption of
state law or by providing a substantive rule for decision," but in
most instances the problem has devolved on the courts. In actions
to enforce rights created by a federal statute which does not provide
a period of limitation, the state statutes of limitations have been
adopted as federal law.'2 State interest rates have also been adopted
in proceedings to which the United States was a party and which
concededly involved a federal question. 13 However, in determining
the legal consequences which flow from acts condemned as unlawful
by a federal statute, the Court has usually applied a uniform rule.14
10. Following the decision in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1937),
there was considerable doubt as to the power of the federal courts to fashion
a "federal common law" in matters not expressly dealt with by a federal
statute but which involved the contractual rights and liabilities and property
interests of the United States. See HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEm 690 (1953). The landmark case in re-establishing the
"federal common law theory" when a proper interest of the national government is involved was Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363
(1943), wherein the Court held that "the rights and duties of the United
States on commercial paper which it issues are governed by federal rather
than local law." 318 U.S. at 366. In the Clearfield case the Supreme Court
recognized that under appropriate circumstances local law might be adopted
as federal law, but if it were so adopted, the authoritative source of the
law would be federal rather than state.
11. Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1958); Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2672, 2674 (1958); see FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a).
12. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155
U.S. 610 (1895) (statutes of limitation of the states apply to actions at law
for infringement of letters patent). But see Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S.
392 (1946) (state statutes of limitations have no application to federal questions in equity). For an excellent discussion of the problems involved and
a recommendation for a general federal statute of limitations that would
provide uniformity throughout the federal system, see Note, 53 COLUM. L.
REV. 68 (1953).
13. Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289 (1941); Brown v.
United States, 263 U.S. 78 (1923); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States,
261 U.S. 299 (1923). In Board of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343

(1939), the federal government was attempting to recover interest on
behalf of an Indian from whom taxes were wrongfully collected. In holding
that Kansas law denying recovery would be applied, the Court stated that
"the state law has been absorbed, as it were, as the governing federal
rule not because state law was the source of the right but because recognition of state interests was not deemed inconsistent with federal policy." 308
U.S. at 351.

14. Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942)

(state doc-

trine of estoppel must yield to the federal policy of the Sherman Act);
Deitrick v. Greany, 309 U.S. 190 (1940) (receiver of a national bank permitted to recover on a note issued in violation of the National Bank Act
even though a good defense was asserted under state law). The principle
of the above cases was extended in D'oench, Duhme & Co. v. F.D.I.C., 315 U.S.
447 (1942) where, although no particular federal statute was violated, recovery was permitted on the grounds that the protection of a federal
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Uniform national law has also been considered to be desirable in
determining the rights of the federal government as to government
obligations' 5 and contracts, 16 and in defining the terms 17 and substantive law 18 of federal statutes. From the foregoing cases there appears
to be no mechanical rule to be applied to determine whether the
Court will choose state diversity or federal uniformity in deciding
a federal question. Indeed, most of the decisions in favor of a
uniform national law have recognized that under appropriate cirinstrumentality should be governed by federal law. The actual basis of the
holding in the D'oench case was that federal law should apply and not
state law of its own force. However, the concurring opinion of Justice
Jackson referred to the adoption question by stating that "federal law is no
juridical chameleon, changing complexion to match that of each state wherein
lawsuits happen to be commenced . . . ." 315 U.S. at 471.
15. National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454 (1945).
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). The Clearfield
doctrine was limited in Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v.
Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956) wherein the Court held that the interest of the
United States was too remote and speculative to justify the application of
a uniform federal rule. The suit was between private parties on bonds issued
by a federal corporation, and state law was applied of its own force.
16. The majority of the cases since the Clearfield decision which have
involved the contract rights and duties of the United States have applied
federal common law. See Pofcher, The Choice of Law, State or Federal, in
Cases Involving Government Contracts, 12 LA. L. REv. 37 (1951). In two
of the government contract cases decided by the Supreme Court, the general
law of contracts, as evidenced by the appropriate Restatement, was applied.
Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947); United States v.
Stahdard Rice Co., 323 U.S. 106 (1944). Although neither of these cases
spoke of adopting local law as federal law, the implication of a uniform
body of contract law was clear. For a contract case in which the national
government argued for the application of state law, see Whitin Mach.
Works v. United States, 175 F.2d 504 (1st Cir. 1949).
The Supreme Court has also expressed its desire for a uniform law in a
tort case in which the federal government sued to recover for its expenses in
caring for a United States soldier who had been negligently injured. After
recognizing that state law had been adopted under appropriate circumstances, the Court stated that "we know of no good reason why the Government's right to be indemnified in these circumstances, or the lack of such a
right, should vary in accordance with the different rulings of the several
states . . . ." United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 310 (1947).
After asserting that a uniform federal rule should be applied, recovery was
denied on the grounds that Congress had not provided a statutory remedy.
17. United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. 361 (1953) ("judgment
creditor" [as used in INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 3672], should have the
same application in all states); Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946)
(state treatment of the term "partnership" will not govern for federal
tax purposes); Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943) (definition of a
felony as used in the Federal Bank Robbery Act to be determined by a
uniform federal rule). Contra, De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956)
(definition of "children" as used in Federal Copyright Act to be determined
by state law); R.F.C. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946) (definition of
"real property" as used in the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act to be
determined by state law).
18. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957)
(substantive law to be applied under § 301(a) of Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 is federal law to be fashioned from the policy of the
national labor laws). But see Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39 (1958)
(state substantive law applied of its own force in determining liability under
§ 31 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939).
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cumstances state law might be adopted. 19 However, the Court has
usually indicated that when a sufficient interest of the national
20
government is involved a uniform rule should be applied.
The Brosnan case is significant in that in spite of the acknowledged
interest of the national government in the enforcement and collection
of federal tax liens, the Supreme Court has chosen to adopt the
various state laws as federal law in any foreclosure proceeding that
does not amount to a suit against the United States.2' Although
recognizing the desirability of a uniform rule, the Court based its
adoption of state law upon two premises. First, the "need for uniformity in this instance is outweighed by the severe dislocation to
local property relationships which would result from our disregarding state procedures."2 2 Certainly a retroactive application of
a uniform national law would cloud many titles secured under an
appropriate state procedure. But the Court could have avoided this
disruptive effect upon past transactions by limiting its decision to
prospective operation.23 Although this procedure has been called
judicial legislation, prospective operation of a decision in the property
24
field is a recognized exception to the general rule of retroactivity.
The second reason for adopting state law was a desire to maintain
the status quo until Congress otherwise determines. The Court
considered itself ill-equipped to achieve "a wise solution of such a
19. See Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947); Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
20. See cases cited in note 19 supra.
21. Prior to the decision in the instant case there was a conflict in the
circuits as to the use of state law in the removal of federal tax liens. In
similar fact situations the following cases held that state law should apply
of its own force: United States v. Cless, 254 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1958) (28
U.S.C. § 2410 not mandatory but provides for a waiver of sovereign immunity where joinder of junior lienors required by state law); United States
v. Boyd, 246 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 889 (1957) (foreclosure of mortgage under a power of sale extinguishes all subordinate
liens including an unpaid federal tax lien). The following cases held that the
statutory remedies were exclusive: Miners Say. Bank v. United States, 110
F. Supp. 563 (M.D. Pa. 1953); United States v. Kensington Shipyard &
Drydock Corp., 169 F.2d 9 (3d Cir. 1948) (federal tax lien was superior to
private lien); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 107 F.2d 311 (6th
Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 630 (1939). For a criticism of the Metropolitan case, see Note, 49 YALE L. J. 1106 (1940). It should be noted that
in none of the above cases did the courts attempt to establish a uniform
federal substantive law or a federal law composed of the various state rules.
22. 363 U.S. at 242.
23. Justice Cardozo clearly stated the rule to be that "a state in defining
the limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself between
the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward." Great
Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932). By
implication the same reasoning would apply to the Supreme Court in
deciding a federal question. See also, Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and
Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1960).
24. See Jones v. Woodstock Iron Co., 95 Ala. 551, 10 So. 635 (1892);
Haskett v. Maxey, 134 Ind. 182, 33 N.E. 358 (1893); Hanks v. McDanell,
307 Ky. 243, 210 S.W.2d 784 (1948).
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far-reaching problem . . . within the confines of a lawsuit."25 Although this approach has been criticized as "diffidence in the creative
exercise of federal judicial power after federal concern has been
asserted," 26 there is validity to the reasoning. If the Court had
attempted the formation of a uniform body of law to be applied to
those cases not covered by the statutes, it is conceivable that as a
result of the delays associated with the case system the benefits of
national uniformity might very well be outweighed by the resulting
confusion to local practitioners and land owners.
It is submitted that there can be no simple "rule of thumb" in
choosing between a uniform federal common law and the adoption
of state law as federal law.27 However, previous decisions seem to
indicate that the choice should be made by balancing the following
factors: (1) legislative intent;28 (2) the essential character of the
federal interest involved; 29 (3) the degree of conflict between the
state law and the objectives of the federal program; 30 (4) the need
for uniformity as compared to the need to integrate the federal
program with the activities of citizens under state laws; 31 (5) the
availability of state law as compared to the judicial difficulty in
fashioning a uniform federal common law;32 and (6) the basic tenets
25. 363 U.s. at 252.
26. Hart, The Relations Between State and FederalLaw, 54 COLum. L. REV.

489, 534 (1954).
27. Id. at 535.

28. "The fact that Congress subjected Defense Plant Corporation's properties to local taxes 'to the same extent according to its value as other real
property is taxed' indicated an intent to integrate congressional permission
to tax with established local tax assessment and collection machinery." R.F.C.
v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 210 (1946). See also Board of Comm'rs v.
United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939).
29. "The question, therefore, is chiefly one of federal fiscal policy, not of
special or peculiar concern to the states or their citizens. And because
those matters ordinarily are appropriate for uniform national treatment
rather than diversified local disposition, as well where Congress has not
acted affirmatively as where it has, they are more fittingly determinable by
independent federal judicial decision than by reference to varying state
policies." United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 311 (1947). See
United States v. 93.970 Acres of Land, 360 U.S. 328 (1959); Howard v.
Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S.
363 (1943).
30. See Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943); Sola Elec. Co. v.
Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942). See also Royal Indem. Co. v.
United States, 313 U.S. 289 (1941); Board of Comm'rs v. United States, 308
U.S. 343 (1939).
31. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956) (domestic relations primarily a matter of state concern); R.F.C. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204
(1946) (state concepts of real property deeply rooted).
32. See Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Textile Workers Union of America
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) wherein he stated that "there are severe
limits on 'judicial inventiveness' even for the most imaginative judges. The
law is not a 'brooding omnipresence in the sky,' . . . and it cannot be drawn
from there like nitrogen from the air." 353 U.S. at 465. See also, Mishkin,
The Variousness of "FederalLaw": Competence and Discretion in the Choice
of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797 (1957).
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of federalism.3 In applying the above criteria to the Brosnan case
it would seem that in theory the Court should have applied a uniform
rule. Certainly a uniform national law is to be desired in the federal
tax program 3 4-uniformity in the sense of protecting the federal
revenues from the vagaries of fifty separate and different rules, and
uniformity in the sense of equal treatment to all citizens affected by
the federal tax lien regardless of geographical location. But from a
practical viewpoint it is unlikely that state law would be so unfair
as to endanger federal revenues. Second lienors are not ignored by
state procedures, and it would be unconstitutional for a state to treat
the national government more severely than it would an ordinary
second lienor. Moreover, the argument for uniform treatment to all
taxpayers is at least balanced by the desirability of permitting all
matters concerning land to be governed by the established law of
the state in which the land is located. Probably the most desirable
solution, which is at best a compromise, is the proposition proposed
by the dissent to the effect that if state law is to be adopted,
federally-created limitations should be attached to it in order to
protect the interests of the national government. It would seem
that a requirement that notice be given to the national government
before its tax liens could be extinguished by state proceedings would
be justified in view of the magnitude and complexity of the federal
35
government and the diversity of the state proceedings.

PARENT AND CHILD-PARENTAL IMMUNITY FROM SUIT BY
MINOR CHILD DOES NOT EXTEND TO PARENT'S ESTATE
An unemancipated child sued the administrator of her mother's
estate in tort for injury caused by the mother's negligent operation of
an automobile. The circuit court dismissed the action on the basis
of parental immunity. On appeal, held, reversed. Parental immunity
33. "Indeed, with all the centralizing growth throughout the years, federal
law is still a largely interstitial product, rarely occupying any field completely, building normally upon legal relationships established by the
states." Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
CoLum. L. Rav. 543, 545 (1954).
34. "A cardinal principle of Congress in its tax scheme is uniformity, as
far as may be." United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. 361, 364 (1953);
see also Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946). But see Commissioner
v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39 (1958).
35. Proposed legislation sponsored by the American Bar Association "would
also enable the discharge of a junior federal lien by a non-judicial sale,
under a power of sale or the like, conditioned upon giving advance notice
of the sale to the United States so that it may protect its interests." Plumb,
Federal Tax Liens: Proposed Revision of the Law, 45 A.B.A.J. 351, 353
(1959).
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from suit by a minor child ends with the death of the parent and
does not extend to the parent's estate. Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336
S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960).
There was no English common law ruling on whether a minor
could sue his parent in tort.' Until 1891 there were no cases directly
on point, but there were three American decisions holding that minors
under the control and protection of a shipmaster, a guardian, and a
schoolmaster, could sue them in tort for abuse of their control. 2 In
one of these cases the judge expressed his belief that a parent would
be liable for a wilful and malicious tort committed against his child. 3
Beginning with a Mississippi case in 1891, three precedent-setting
decisions established that a parent is not liable for negligent or
intentional torts committed against his child. 4 This rule is now
generally accepted by American courts. 5 In addition to policy reasons,
these decisions are sometimes influenced by the analogous common
law doctrine of interspousal immunity and also by the assumption
that the absence of a common law rule implies the inability to sue. 6
The public policy of maintaining parental control and domestic
harmony is the most important factor in the widespread acceptance
of parental immunity.7 The courts usually argue-and sometimes
1. Villaret v. Villaret, 83 App. D.C. 311, 169 F.2d 677 (1948); Mahnke v.
Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 85 N.H. 352, 150
A. 905 (1930); Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 425 (1951).
2. Gould v. Christianson, 10 Fed. Cas. 857 (No. 5,636), (C.C.S.D. N.Y.
1836) (shipmaster); Nelson v. Johansen, 18 Neb. 180, 24 N.W. 730 (1885)
(guardian); Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 42, 76 Am. Dec. 156 (1859); (schoolmaster).

3. "The parent, unquestionably, is answerable only for malice or wicked
motives or an evil heart in punishing his child." Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt.
42, 45, 76 Am. Dec. 156 (1859).
4. In Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891), a mother was
held not liable for the false imprisonment of her daughter in an insane
asylum for eleven days. In McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W.
664 (1903), the court refused to permit an action to collect damages for
cruel and inhuman treatment against the child. In Roller v. Roller, 37
Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905), a father was held not liable for the rape of
his daughter.
5. See Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423, 425 (1951).
6. See McKelvey v. McKelvey, supra note 4, and Hewellette v. George,
supra note 4. For criticism of the analogy between the parent-child relationship and the inter-spousal relationship, see Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra
note 1; 1 HARPER & JAwES, TORTS § 8.10 (1956); PROSsER, TORTs 670, 675 (2d
ed. 1955); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons In Domestic Relations, 43 HARV.
L. REV. 1030, 1032, 1056 (1930); McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5
VILL. L. REV. 521, 523 (1960); Sanford, Personal Torts Within the Family, 9
VAND.L. REV.823, 825 (1956).
7. "The Peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a
sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and the
best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear in
court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries
suffered at the hands of parents." Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So.
885, 887 (1891). "[T]he rule of law prohibiting suit, between parent and
child is based upon the interests that society has in preserving harmony in
the domestic relations." Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
See Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423, 425 (1951).
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with much effusive eulogy on the home- 8 that allowing minors to
sue their parents would encourage unruly children to usurp domestic control, which would destroy the harmony of the home and
disrupt the family as a quasi-governing unit. However, the same
courts never allow this argument to prevent property actions by a
child against his parent. 9 Another reason for immunity which has
become important with the advent of liability insurance is the
danger of collusion between the parent and child. 10 However, liability insurance has decreased the danger of disrupting parental control
and domestic tranquillity by placing the real interest in defending
the suit with the insurance company." It is very likely that the
immunity rule will become less popular in the future. Many courts
are now creating exceptions. Some are in agreement with the instant
2
ruling that the doctrine should not extend to the parent's estate,
and there is a trend toward allowing actions for wilful and malicious
torts. 13 Also, when there is some additional relationship covered by
insurance such as master-servant or carrier-passenger, a few courts
disallow immunity.' 4 There has been much criticism of the rule by
legal scholars and judges. Many of them feel that the dangers accompanying parent-child suits have been grossly exaggerated and
that a basic inconsistency inheres in allowing property actions and
disallowing tort actions.
The Missouri court accepted the policy of maintaining parental
control and family harmony. It maintained that the immunity rule
15
does not preclude a duty but creates a procedural disability to sue
8. "There are some things that are worth more than money, one of them

is the peace of the fireside and the contentment of the home, for of such is
the kingdom of righteousness." Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12,
16 (1923).
9. The same court which praised the home in note 8 made the following
comment about property actions by a minor against its parent: "The Law
will not permit a parent, or other, to take the property of a minor child, or
any one else, hold it unlawfully, and thus profit by his own wrong. This
would be an unjust enrichment which the law cannot condone." 118 S.E.
at 16. It is universally agreed that a minor can maintain a property action
against its parent. See Preston v. Preston, 102 Conn. 96, 128 Atl. 292 (1925);
Lamb v. Lamb, 146 N.Y. 317, 41 N.E. 26 (1895); Hollingsworth v. Beaver, 59
S.W. 464 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900).

10. Villaret v. Villaret, supra note 1. See Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423, 436
(1951).

11. For other arguments which have been advanced for immunity see
McCurdy, Torts Between Persons In Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REV.
1030, 1072 (1930).
12. Ruiz v. Clancey, 182 La. 935, 162 So. 734 (1935), Mahnke v. Moore,
supranote 1.
13. Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961 (1901);
Mahnke v. Moore, supra note 1. See Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423, 451 (1951).
14. Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra note 1; Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4
S.E.2d 343 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
15. The Missouri court is in conformity with the majority of courts on
this point. See Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423, 426 (1951).
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which does not survive the death of the wrongdoer. 16 The court
stated that since the mother is dead her control over the child cannot
be disrupted and family harmony cannot be destroyed. It was then
decided that since the reason for the rule no longer exists, there was
no need to prevent the action.
Since in the instant case the minor sued her mother's estate
through her father as next friend, the court correctly decided that
subversion of parental control was precluded by the impossibility of
a parent-child conflict. Other cases with similar fact situations, however, might create family disturbances. Although there was no
evidence of bitterness in this case, the dissenting judge felt that
similar suits could engender bitter feelings among the remaining
members of the family.17 However, the danger of embittering family
relations is a necessary risk in the settlement of almost any estate,
and there is no reason to favor the average settlement suit over this
type of suit. Another objection to the ruling might be the possibility
of a parent-child conflict if the next friend was not the living parent.
However, this is not felt to be very important since in the absence of
insurance or third party intermeddlers acting as next friends, parentchild suits are principally effects, not causes, of family discord. 18
While circularity of cause and effect means that suits can increase
the strife in an anarchic family, such families could probably find no
peace even in the suit's absence. When the tort is covered by insurance or when an intermeddler is responsible for the suit, a
parent-child conflict will usually not exist. In the case of intermeddlers, ill will between the parent and the next friend will be the
chief result; enmity between the parent and child is unlikely. As
for the influence of insurance, a parent-child conflict is impossible
since the insurance company has the real interest in defending the
suit. The courts inadvertently admit the fallacy of the domestic
harmony argument through allowing parent-child property actions
and disallowing tort actions. There is no compelling reason for preferring property rights over domestic tranquillity or personal rights")
16. The survival of the cause of action is guaranteed by a statute. 336

S.W.2d at 72.

17. "[T]he bitterness engendered, the estates destroyed, the relationships
disrupted; the evils may depend, in some measure, upon what members
of the family remain. The reasons for the rules may often outlive a death."
336 S.W.2d at 75.
18. Speaking of the related problem of suits between spouses, Professor
McCurdy made the following comment: "There is nothing to show that in
the states which permit such action the peace and harmony of the home
is disrupted to any greater extent, or that the courts are deluged with a
greater flood of such litigation, than in the states which deny the action."
McCurdy, Torts Between Persons In Domestic Relations 43 HARV. L. REv.
1030, 1053 (1930).

19. Judging from eulogies often given to the home, it is doubtful that any
courts would prefer property rights over domestic tranquillity. "The policy
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and it is not apparent that property suits are less acrimonious than
personal suits.20 The danger of collusive fraud against insurance
companies is a stronger argument for immunity than disruption of
the home. It is submitted, however, that most juries could adequately
face this danger.2 ' Furthermore, insurance companies could exclude
their own liability from parent-child torts in the insurance contracts
if they were being seriously hurt by the actions. The best policy
is to allow parent-child tort actions under all circumstances. There
may be dangers involved in such a policy, but it is felt that the
value of compensating minors for their personal injuries outweighs
these dangers.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY-IMPLIED WARRANTY-RECOVERY
FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY NOTWITHSTANDING
LACK OF PRIVITY AND CONTRACTUAL DISCLAIMER
Two recent decisions are illustrative of the expanding area of
recovery in the field of products liability. In one, the vendee of an
automobile and his wife instituted a suit against the seller, Bloomfield Motors, and the manufacturer, Chrysler Corporation, the wife
seeking to recover for damages sustained while driving the allegedly
defective automobile and the husband pursuing his consequential
rights. The plaintiff's suit was largely predicated upon the defendants' breach of an implied warranty of merchantability,1 which by
statutory definition was an integral part of the sale.2 The plaintiffvendee signed a purchase order containing, in obscure print, express
heretofore established in this state with respect to the maintenance of the
family as the social unit is diametrically opposed to the communist theory
which Russia has sought to put in practice." Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C.
577, 118 S.E. 12, 16 (1923).

20. "It may be replied with greater force that property and contract

causes of action are recognized, and the family peace may be disturbed just

as much by these as by personal tort actions. It is common knowledge that
some of the most acrimonious family disputes have arisen in respect to

property." McCurdy, Torts Between Persons In Domestic Relations, 43 HARv.,
L. REv. 1030, 1075 (1930).

21. "But there is always the possibility of collusion between an injured
plaintiff and the insured and while the temptation might be greater when a
family relation exists between them, there are methods of detecting collusion and the usual condition requiring co-operation between the insured
and the insurer may be thought to be some protection to the latter." HARPER
&JAMEs, op. cit. supranote 6, at 650.
1. The plaintiff's complaint set out three causes of action, the breach of
both an express and implied warranty and the negligence of the defendant.
The negligence counts were dismissed and the case was submitted to the
jury solely on the issue of an implied warranty of merchantability.
2. N.J. REv. STAT. § 46: 30-20 (1937). This section is identical with the
provisions of the UNiFoRM

SALES ACT

§ 14.
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warranties by both the manufacturer and the dealer in which they
contracted to repair or replace defective parts within a limited time.
The purchase order excluded all other warranties, express or implied. The defendants maintain that the absence of privity of contract
between the manufacturer and either plaintiff together with the
lack of privity between the wife and the dealer would preclude either
plaintiff's recovery. It is also contended by the defendants that the
contractual disclaimer of all other warranties was an effective bar
to the actions. The jury found that the defective product had caused
the accident and that both defendants had breached an implied
warranty of merchantability by supplying the product. Judgment
was entered for the plaintiffs and on certiorari to the Supreme Court
of New Jersey, held, affirmed. The contemplated user of an automobile may recover from the manufacturer or dealer for the breach of
an implied warranty, irrespective of a lack of privity or a contractual disclaimer of all implied warranties. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
In the second case, plaintiffs, purchasers of an automobile from a
dealer, brought an action against the manufacturer seeking recovery
for injuries suffered while driving the allegedly defective automobile.
The suit was grounded upon the defendant's breach of both an
express and an implied warranty, the latter arising under the provisions of the Tennessee enactment of the Uniform Sales Act. The
purchasers signed a sales contract identical to the one described in
the Henningsen case, receiving an express warranty from the dealer
limited to replacement of defective parts and which disavowed claims
against the manufacturer based upon all other warranties, express or
implied. The manufacturer contended that a lack of privity barred
the suit. On the defendant's appeal from an adverse judgment, held,
affirmed. A vendee of an automobile may recover from the manufacturer for a breach of an express or implied warranty if the
manufacturer is the actual entity with whom the vendee is dealing
and the vendor is a mere conduit interposed by the manufacturer
to exempt itself from liability. General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 338
S.W.2d 655 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1960).
A supplier's liability on a warranty of his goods arises when the
product is inferior to his express or implied representations. The
Uniform Sales Act, which is almost identical to the sales acts enacted
in New Jersey and Tennessee, provides for an implied warranty of
merchantable quality when the goods are purchased by description
from a seller who deals in goods of that description. 3 There has been
3. N.J. REV. STAT. § 46: 30-21(2) (1937); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1215 (2)
(1956). These sections are substantially the provisions of the UNIFORM
SALES ACT § 15 (2).
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considerable conflict over whether the obligation imposed is contractual in nature or rests upon the tort concept of strict liability.
At its inception a breach-of-warranty action sounded in tort,4 but
gradually the majority of courts, considering the action to be in
contract, 5 refused to impose liability unless the plaintiff was seeking
recovery against his immediate vendor. 6 The Uniform Sales Act's
definitions of the terms "buyer" and "seller" were drawn with the
immediate parties to the sale in mind. 7 The new Uniform Commercial Code extends the warranty only to the family or household
guests of the immediate buyer.8 Dissatisfaction with the privity
requirement has been expressed both by courts 9 and by text writers. 10
Exceptions to the privity rule espoused by a substantial number of
jurisdictions have been limited almost exclusively to cases involving
defective foods." The analogy to foodstuffs prompted a further abrogation of the privity requirement in cases involving animal food,12
4. DICKERSON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER 35 (1951). The
wrong was a misrepresentation of fact and the action was trepass upon the

case. See Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel, Strict Liability to the Consumer, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1103 (1960).
5. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L.

REV. 117, 119-22 (1943). Shortly after 1750 an express warranty began to
be recognized as a term of the sales contract.
6. A warranty was held unavailable to members of a buyer's family in
Borucki v. MacKenzie Bros. Co., 125 Conn. 92, 3 A.2d 224 (1938); Hazelton
v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 88 N.H. 409, 190 Atl. 280 (1937). Contra, Jacob

E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942); Swift

& Co. v. Wells, 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203 (1959). For authority that the
buyer was precluded from recovering from a manufacturer with whom he
was not in privity see Rachlin v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96 F.2d 597
(2d Cir. 1938); Drury v. Armour & Co., 140 Ark. 371, 216 S.W. 40 (1919). Cf.
Dotson v. International Harvester Co., 365 Mo. 625, 285 S.W.2d 585 (1955),
holding a dealer not to be the agent of his manufacturer.
7. Prosser, supra note 4, at 1129. But cf. Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14
Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939) to the effect that the UNIFORM SALES ACT §
1 abolishes the privity requirement. DICKERSON, op. cit. supra note 4 at 10607 (1951) advocates extending the implied warranty of the UNIFoRM SALES
ACT to the consumer.
8. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318. This code is in effect in six states:
Connecticut, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island.
9. Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 863, 353 P.2d 575 (1960);
Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
10. DICKERSON, op. cit. supra note 4, at 105; 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY 378-82 (1960); 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1570-74 (1956); Prosser,
supra note 4 at 1114-24; Symposium-Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 24
TENN. L. REV. 923 (1957). But see 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 244 at 648 (1948).
11. There are seventeen jurisdictions which in food cases enforce strict liability or a warranty to the consumer without a privity requirement; the same
result is reached by statute in five other states. There are fourteen states
which probably reject the rule. For a collection of these jurisdictions and
the applicable cases see Prosser, supra note 4, at 1107-10. This development
is probably an extension of the common law notion that the seller of goods
for human consumption owes a special responsibility to the consumer.
MELICK, THE SALE OF FOOD AND DRINK 1, 7 (1936).
12. McAfee v. Cargill, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1954), 8 VAND. L. RLM.
149 (1955); Midwest Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo.,
1959).
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hair dye,13 soap, 14 and polio vaccine. 15 Various ingenious theories
have been espoused to justify the circumvention of privity: a warranty running with the goods,' 6 a fictitious agency,' 7 a continuing
unilateral offer to the consumer, 18 an express warranty communicated
to the consumer by the manufacturer's advertising, 19 an assignment
of the warranty,20 and a third party beneficiary contract.21 In the
last few years there have been a number of decisions bridging the
privity gap in sales embracing such subject matter as an electric
cable,22 a trailer,2 a cinder block, 24 grinding wheels, 25 automobile
tires, 26 a truck 27 and an exploding beverage bottle.28 The significance
of the instant case lies in the fact that previous Tennessee and New
Jersey decisions had held privity to be an essential element even
29
when foodstuffs were the subject matter of the warranty.
13. Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954).

14. Kruper v. Procter & Gamble Co., 113 N.E.2d 605 (Ohio App. 1953),
rev'd on other grounds, 160 Ohio St. 489, 117 N.E.2d 7 (1954).
15. Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Cal. App. 1960).
16. The leading case advocating a warranty "running with the goods" is
Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927). See
also Simpson v. American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940).
17. This was the approach used in the instant Tennessee case. The dealer
was said to be a mere agent, conduit, or subterfuge through which the
manufacturer tried to escape liability.
18. Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1893] 1 Q.B. 256.
19. The leading case on a seller's express warranty to the consumer
through his advertising is Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d
409, ajFd per curiam on rehearing,15 P.2d 1118 (1932), aff'd on second appeal,
179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934). See also Mannsz v. Macwhyte, 155 F.2d
445 (3d Cir. 1946); Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App.
1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167
Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958), 11 VAND. L. REv. 1459 (1958).
20. Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 863, 353 P.2d 575 (1960).
But this approach would not extend the warranty to an injured third party
not in privity with the vendor or vendee.
21. Acme Brick Co. v. Hamilton, 218 Ark. 742, 238 S.W.2d 658 (1951);
Jeffery v. Hanson, 39 Wash. 2d 855, 239 P.2d 346 (1952).
22. Continental Copper & Steel Indus., Inc. v. E. C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc.,
104 So. 2d 40 (Fla. App. 1958).
23. Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959), Contra, Odom v.
Ford Motor Co., 230 S.C. 320, 95 S.E.2d 601 (1956) (tractor).
24. Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply Co., 353 Mich. 120,
90 N.W.2d 873 (1958). This action was based upon the implied warranty
of merchantability. The trial court denied plaintiff's recovery because of an
absence of privity, but was reversed by the Michigan Supreme Court. However, the language of the opinion proposing that a breach of warranty was
tantamount to negligence clouded the status of this decision. 90 N.W.2d at
879.
25. Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., supra note 20; Di Vello v. Gardner Mach.
Co., 46 Ohio Op. 161, 102 N.E.2d 289 (C.P. 1951).
26. Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960)
applying Michigan law. Contra,Wessley v. Seiberling Rubber Co., 90 F. Supp.
'709 (W. D. Mo. 1950).
27. Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
28. Canada Dry Bottling Co. v. Shaw, 118 So. 2d 840, (Fla. App. 1960). The
,case involved a food container, but it is difficult to ascertain the analogy
to foodstuffs that prompted the court to allow a recovery against the
manufacturer.
29. Duncan v. Juman, 25 N.J. Super. 330, 96 A.2d 415 (1953) in which the
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As a general rule a contract provision excluding all warranties not
expressly declared will defeat a recovery based upon an implied
warranty. 30 However, some courts, sensing inequities of the parties'
bargaining position, construe the disclaimer of warranty obligation
against the vendor. The focus of this jaundiced eye upon disclaimers
is reflected in decisions which completely construe away the intended
effect of the disclaimer, 3 ' find that the buyer is not charged with
notice of the limitation, 32 or rule that the disclaimer is contrary to
natural justice and therefore void.33 The Uniform Sales Act has
hindered the judiciary's attack upon disclaimers by a general sanction
of their use.3
The opinion in the Henningsen case contains an extensive review
of the status of the law of warranty, the conclusion being that there
is little merit in many of the obstacles that have historically impeded
the consumer's relief. In circumventing the privity requirement the
court did not indulge in the previously mentioned devices, but held
that where "commodities [which are] sold are such that if defectively
manufactured they will be dangerous to life or limb, then society's
interests can only be protected by eliminating the requirement of
privity .... '35 The burden of loss should be placed upon the manufacturer who is "in a position to either control the danger or make
an equitable distribution of losses . . .-36 to the public at large. The
court felt the distinction between foodstuffs and automobiles was
illogical-each possessed a great potentiality for harm to the concourt refused to make a warranty available to members- of the buyer's family.
Cf. Schlosser v. Goldberg, 123 N.J.L. 470, 9 A.2d 699 (Sup. Ct. 1939).

Ten-

nessee refused to extend liability without privity in Crigger v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S.W. 155 (1915) and Coca-Cola Bottling
Works v. Sullivan, 178 Tenn. 405, 158 S.W.2d 721 (1942).
30. Getzoff v. Von Lengerke Buick Co., 14 N.J. Misc. 750, 187 Atl. 539
(Sup. Ct. 1936), which was overruled in New Jersey by the instant case.
The action was brought by a vendee of a defectively constructed automobile
against the seller alleging breach of an implied warranty. A conditional
sales contract disavowing warranties not endorsed in writing was held to
bar his recovery. Cf. Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. v. Hocking, 54 N.D.
559, 209 N.W. 996 (1926); Landes & Co. v. Fallows, 81 Utah 432, 19 P.2d 389
(1933).

31. Disclaimer applicable only to express, not implied, warranties: Hardy
v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 38 Ga. App. 463, 144 S.E. 327 (1928)
(disclaimer did not attempt to exclude implied warranties as did the instant
case). See Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 27, for authority that a
disclaimer is ineffective against an implied warranty of merchantability.
32. Federal Motor Truck Sales Corp. v. Shanus, 190 Minn. 5, 250 N.W.
713 (1933) (fine print); Black v. B. B. Kirkland Seed Co., 158 S.C. 112, 155
S.E. 268 (1930) (obscure place).
33. Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen, Inc., 169 Misc. 879, 9 N.Y.S.2d 110
(New York City Munic. Ct. 1939). See 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 28.25 at

1590
valid
34.
35.
36.

(1956), for a view that the disclaimer of implied warranties is not
where the parties bargaining position is grossly unequal.
UNIFORM SALES ACT § 71.
161 A.2d at 81.
Ibid.
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sumer. The Henningsen court nullified the effect of the disclaimer by
holding that since the buyer had no practical freedom of choice, a
forfeiture of rights imposed by operation of law was against public
policy and void.3 7 The Uniform Sales Act's authorization of a qualification of warranty obligations by the parties was not intended to
allow the manufacturer or dealer to escape liability by using the gross
disparity in the bargaining position between buyer and seller.38 As
the implied warranty does not depend upon the intent of the parties
but is a child of the law, the disclaimer is an effort to frustrate the
purpose of the law.
The Dodson court ignored the intended effect of the disclaimer
contract, probably leaving the status of such disclaimers unsettled
in Tennessee. Liability in the Dodson case was grounded upon two
findings: an implied warranty of merchantability as defined by the
Uniform Sales Act and an express warranty to the consumer through
the manufacturer's advertising representations. The objection to
privity was overcome by a determination that the manufacturer was
the actual entity with whom the plaintiffs dealt and that the dealer
was utilized by the manufacturer to exempt itself from liability. In
resorting to this device, the Dodson court's approach was not dissimilar to the Henningsen tack-that the goods were produced not
for an intermediate dealer but for an ultimate consumer. But the
court in its examination of the privity requirement considered only
negligence cases, thus clouding the effect of the decision.
Refusing to be restrained by traditional bars to the consumer's
recovery, the two instant cases arrive at a result which is indicative
of the future development of the law. That a user of an inherently
dangerous product may rely upon the manufacturer's professed skill
to assure that the product is safe seems to be a socially desirable
policy. Liability to an ultimate consumer will be a healthy incentive
for manufacturers to make their products safe. The risk of loss will
be spread by price adjustments to those who can best afford it-the
general public. The consumer's redress will not have to depend solely
upon proof of the manufacturer's negligence, a course that necessarily
involves many pitfalls for the plaintiff-consumer. 39 However, courts,
including the instant ones, which speak of liability in terms of a warranty running to the user, give the warranty concept a "violent
37. The court also noted that the purchaser probably did not have notice
of the terms as the disclaimer was in very small print at an obscure place
in the sales contract. However, the rejection of the disclaimer as being
contrary to public policy was the unequivocal holding in the instant case.
38. The form warranty is standard not only with Chrysler Corporation, but
is the uniform warranty recommended by the Automobile Manufacturers
Association and was used in connection with almost 100% of the domestic
passenger car production of 1958. 161 A.2d at 95.
39. Prosser, supra note 4, at 1114-20.
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pounding and twisting."40 Why strain valid principles of the law
of sales to reach a result which is more logically justifiable by an
extension of the tort concept of strict liability? Then courts would no
longer be required to resort to fictions or vague policy considerations
to overcome objections to privity and contractual disclaimers.

REAL PROPERTY-ESTATE BY ENTIRETY-EQUITABLE
CONVERSION CONVERTS OWNERSHIP OF PROCEEDS TO
TENANCY IN COMMON ABSENT A CONTRARY INTENT
Husband and wife, H and W, entered into a contract for the sale
of land which they owned as tenants by the entirety. While this
contract was still executory and before the entire purchase price had
been paid, H died intestate. Upon W's failure, as administratrix of
H's estate, to include any part of the unpaid balance under the
contract in the estate inventory, decendent's son brought a declaratory judgment action to determine the estate's interest under the
contract. On appeal by the defendant from an adverse judgment,
the Supreme Court of Oregon, held, affirmed. When the doctrine of
equitable conversion is applied to an executory contract for the sale
of realty held by the vendors as tenants by the entirety, the proceeds
of the sale will be impressed with tenancy in common characteristics
absent a showing of contrary intent of the vendors. Panushka v.
Panushka, 349 P.2d 450 (Ore. 1960).
Usually a court of equity will apply the doctrine of equitable
conversion to realty when a contract for the sale thereof becomes
binding,' unless the presumption of conversion 2 is rebutted, 3 or found
inapplicable. 4 Conversion takes place on the presumption that this
is the intention of the owners of the property, 5 and flows from the
maxim that equity regards as done that which ought to be done.6
Once this conversion takes place a problem arises as to whether or
40. Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal Devices,

24 CoLum. L. REV. 335, 358 (1924).

1. Thomson v. Smith, 63 N.Y. 301 (1875); Stephenson v. Yandle, 4 Tenn.

109 (1816); Lysaght v. Edwards, 2 Ch. D. 499 (1876).

If, however, the vendee

defaults, the conversion will fail with the contract. Williams v. Haddock, 145
N.Y. 144,39 N.E. 825 (1895).

2. The presumption was recognized and applied in Lynch v. Burger, 26
Tenn. App. 120, 168 S.W.2d 487 (1942).
3. See, e.g., Foy v. King, 248 Mich. 650, 227 N.W. 541 (1929); Matter of
DeWitt's Will, 202 Misc. 167, 114 N.Y.S.2d 81 (Surr. Ct. Yates County 1952).
4. See, e.g., Matter of Maguire's Estate, 251 App. Div. 337, 269 N.Y. Supp.
528, af'd, 277 N.Y. 527, 13 N.E.2d 458 (1938); Williams v. Haddock, 145
N.Y. 144, 39 N.E. 825 (1895).
5. See note 2 supra.
6. Bates v. Dennis, 30 Tenn. App. 94, 203 S.W.2d 928 (1946).
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not the balance of the purchase price under an executory contract
for sale of land, held by tenants by the entirety, is subject to the
right of survivorship when neither the contract nor parol evidence
establishes the form of co-ownership the vendors intended should
result. In jurisdictions recognizing tenancy by the entirety in
personalty, the courts generally have no difficulty impressing proceeds
from the sale of entirety realty with entirety characteristics,7 either
under the presumption of no intention to change the characteristics
of ownership,8 or under a general presumption of entirety attaching
to personalty conveyed to husband and wife. This normally desirable result has also been reached in jurisdictions having a general
rule against personal property being held by the entirety. 9 The courts
of these jurisdictions have circumvented the rule in several instances10 or made the proceeds from this type of sale an exception."
In at least two of these jurisdictions, specific statutory enactment
now forbids application of this rule to proceeds from the sale of
entirety land.12 Another approach which has been advocated to
achieve this seemingly desirable result is to refuse application of the
doctrine of equitable conversion when it appears to conflict with the
undisclosed intent of the parties. 13 As a general rule, however, these
jurisdictions have not allowed the proceeds to be impressed with
entirety characteristics. 14 If the parties' intent is clearly shown to be
otherwise, however, the courts of all jurisdictions indicate they
will effectuate such intent.
The court in the instant case, after determining that an equitable
conversion takes place when a contract for sale becomes binding, 15
noted that the entirety estate is not destroyed and the vendor retains
16
naked legal title in trust as security for the purchase price. They
17
then followed strong Oregon precedent and impressed the proceeds
7. Ciconte v. Barba, 19 Del. Ch. 6, 161 Atl. 926 (1932); Brell v. Brell, 143
Md. 443, 122 Atl. 635 (1923); Childs v. Childs, 293 Mass. 67, 199 N.E. 383
(1935); Schwind v. O'Halloran, 346 Mo. 486, 142 S.W.2d 55 (1940); Frost v.

Frost, 200 Mo. 474, 98 S.W. 527 (1906); In re Bamberry's Estate, 56 Pa. 628, 27
Atl. 405 (1893).
8. American Cent. Ins. Co. v. Whitlock, 122 Fla. 363, 165 So. 380 (1936);
Allen v. Tate, 58 Miss. 585 (1881); In re Bramberry's Estate, 56 Pa. 628, 27
Atl. 405 (1893).
9. See Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 8, §§ 9, 10, 15 (1959).
10. See Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 8, § 8 (1959).
11. Kochring v. Bowman, 194 Ind. 433, 142 N.E. 117 (1924).

12. MICH. STAT. ANx. § 26.191 (1925); ORE. REV. STAT. § 93:240 (1957).
13. 41 CORNELL L.Q. 155 (1955). See also the dissent in the instant case.

349 P.2d at 459.
14. Fogleman v. Shively, 4 Ind. App. 197, 30 N.E. 909 (1892); Central
Trust Co. v. Street, 95 N.J. Eq. 278, 127 Atl. 82 (1923); In re Thompson's
Estate, 81 Misc. 86, 142 N.Y.S. 1064 (1913); Wilson v. Ervin, 227 N.C. 396
42 S.E.2d 468 (1947); Stout v. Van Zante, 109 Ore. 430, 219 P. 804, 220 P. 414
(1923).

15. 349 P.2d at 452.
16. Id. at 454.
17. Id. at 455-56.
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under the contract with tenancy in common characteristics. The
court indicated that if the vendors of entirety property wish to hold
the proceeds jointly, they may do so, but they must affirmatively
assert this desire since in Oregon such an intention will not be im18
plied.
This case points up to estate planners an easily overlooked pitfall,
yet one which may be conveniently overcome. Even in states such
as Oregon where a strong policy for tenancy in common ownership
of personalty by husband and wife exists, proceeds may be jointly
held with right of survivorship if an intention to do so is manifest.
This manifestation can be placed in the contract itself, or may be
shown by a collateral instrument executed by the owners. 19 In
states which have no statute governing the proceeds from this type
of sale, it would seem advisable to clarify the mode of ownership
desired by the vendors in order to avoid litigation should one spouse
die. In those jurisdictions which would impress the proceeds with
entirety characteristics, if the intent of the vendors is to hold as
tenants in common this too should be made manifest in writing. 20
It should be noted that tax consequences may be in an important
consideration in determining the type of ownership desired.

TAXATION-INCOME TAX-DEDUCTION ALLOWED FOR
LEGAL EXPENSES INCURRED IN DEFENSE OF
CRIMINAL TAX SUIT
In their joint income tax returns for 1948 through 1952, taxpayer
and her husband claimed deductions for legal expenses incurred in
connection with taxpayer's successful defense of two charges of
criminal income tax evasion.' The Tax Court allowed the deduction.2
18. Id. at 456-57.
19. Id. at 457. See also Oliphant v. McAmis, 197 Tenn. 367, 273 S.W.2d
151 (1954), where it was held that oral statements would be admissible to
determine the type of tenancy intended in personalty.
20. Ciconte v. Barba, 19 Del. Ch. 6, 161 Atl. 925 (1932); Dodson v. Na-

tional Title Ins. Co., 159 Fla. 371, 31 So. 2d 402 (1947); Schwind v. O'Hal-

loran, 346 Mo. 486, 142 S.W.2d 55 (1940).
1. Two criminal charges against her husband in connection with her
individual returns for the years 1943 and 1944 resulted in an adjudgment
of guilty on one, and a dismissal of the other. The charges against taxpayer
were dismissed, but the Commissioner on his appeal made no distinction
between an acquittal on the merits and a dismissal of the indictment.
Neither the Tax Court nor this court commented upon the fact that taxpayer's husband received a criminal conviction upon her individual fraudulent return. She and her husband filed joint returns for the years in which
the legal expenses in connection with the criminal charges were made. The
civil case for determining her liabilities in connection with the deficiency
assessment and addition to the tax for fraud was settled by compromise.
2. International Trading Co., 17 CCH TAx CT. MEm. 521 (1958).
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On appeal to the circuit court of appeals, held, affirmed. A criminal
tax case involves the determination of tax liability, and reasonable
legal expenses incident thereto are deductible. Commissioner v.
Shapiro, 278 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1960). 3
Under the 1939 Code as originally enacted, 4 and under all prior
Revenue Acts, litigation expenses could not be deducted unless they
qualified as ordinary and necessary expenses of a trade or business.
A 1942 amendment allowed deduction for ordinary and necessary
expenses of an individual in certain profit-seeking activities of the
taxpayer,5 thereby enlarging the area in which litigation expenses
could be deducted. In civil cases involving non-tax matters, the
courts have found litigation expenses to be ordinary and necessary
to the trade or business or profit-seeking activity of the taxpayer,
both when the litigation was successful and when it was unsuccessful.6 Public policy does not necessarily require the disallowance of
expenses of an unsuccessful civil suit even though the activity involved may also be subject to criminal prosecution. 7 In criminal cases
involving non-tax matters, the courts have allowed deduction of
litigation expenses as ordinary and necessary in a successful defense,8
but have generally not allowed a deduction where there was a
conviction, either on the ground that criminal activity is not ordinary
3. The Commissioner did not authorize an appeal of the instant decision.
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 23 (a) (1) (A) allowed as deductions from gross
income for trade or business expenses, "all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade
or business."
5. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 23(a) (2) added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 819 (1942)

was the first provision for deducting expenses for producing income other

than in a trade or business. '"Non-trade or non-business expenses. In the
case of an individual, all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year for the production or collection of income,
or for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for
the production of income."
6. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943) (contest of a
civil fraud order issued by the Postmaster General). "To say that this
course of conduct [defending the suit] and the expenses which it involved
were extraordinary or unnecessary would be to ignore -the ways of conduct
and the forms of speech prevailing in the business world. . . . Surely the
expenses were no less ordinary or necessary than expenses resulting from
the defense of a damage suit based on malpractice, or fraud, or breach of
fiduciary duty. Yet in these latter cases legal expenses have been held
deductible without regard to the success of the defense." 320 U.S. at 472.
7. Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943). "It has never been
thought, however, that the mere fact that an expenditure bears a remote
relation to an illegal act makes it non-deductible. The language of section
23(a) contains no express reference to the lawful or unlawful character of
the business expenses which are declared to be deductible." 320 U.S. at 474.
8. See, e.g., John W. Clark, 30 T.C. 1330 (1958), allowing deduction of
legal expenses connected with a charge of assault with intent to rape,
growing out of a business interview. The Commissioner had denied the
deduction on the theory, which he has espoused in many other cases, that
defense of a criminal charge is a personal expense because the acts leading
to a criminal charge are personal acts rather than ordinary and necessary
incidents of a business.
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and necessary, 9 or on the ground of public policy.10 At first the
courts were inclined to find that expenses of contesting or determining tax matters, whether civil 'or criminal, were personal," but
since a 1945 Supreme Court decision,12 litigation expenses of civil
income tax determinations have been deductible, regardless of the
taxpayer's success. 13 Expenses of determining the amount of gift tax
liability were held to be non-deductible. 14 As to criminal tax
charges, deduction of litigation expenses of an unsuccessful defense
has uniformly been denied on the same grounds as in the unsuccessful criminal non-tax case.15 The issue of deductibility of litigation
expenses of a successfully defended individual criminal tax case has
16
not been decided by a court of appeals prior to the instant case,
and the Tax Court had not been consistent on that issue.17 The 1954
Code has added a new provision, allowing deduction of expenses for
determination of liability for "any" tax.18 As yet, no case under this
new provision has been decided by a court of appeals.
The instant case was decided under the 1939 Code as amended.
The Tax Court had allowed the deduction of the legal expense for
9. See, e.g., Pantages Theatre Co. v. Welch, 71 F.2d 68 (9th Cir. 1934).
10. Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.

1931) was the first appellate decision to deny a deduction for legal expenses

of an unsuccessful criminal defense, and the only one to examine the
reasons for denial, on the ground of public policy, of an otherwise deductible
litigation expense. The court confessed an inability to explain, on a logical
basis, the reasons for so holding, but said that if fines and costs were not to
be deductible, neither should legal expenses be deductible.
11. Stoddard v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944). "To extend this
language [of section 23] to make it possible for taxpayers to deduct not only
expenses which resulted, or were intended to result, in the acquisition of
taxable income but also the expense of litigation over the amount of their
income taxes would be too great a stretch. . . ." 141 F.2d at 80.

12. Bingham's Trust v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 (1945) was construed

by the lower courts and the Commissioner as holding that expenses of an
individual for the determination of liability for income taxes are deductible.
13. Stoddard v. Commissioner, 152 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1945). "In the light
of the subsequent decision in Bingham's Trust v. Commissioner . . . we
were wrong." 152 F.2d at 446.
14. Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118 (1952) refused to extend deductibility of litigation expenses to a determination of gift tax liability.
15. Hopkins v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 166 (6th Cir. 1959). The court
referred to "the settled rule that legal fees paid by a taxpayer in his defense
of an unsuccessful criminal trial for income tax evasion are not deductible."
271 F.2d at 167.
16. Commissioner v. People's-Pittsburgh Trust Co., 60 F.2d 187 (3d Cir.
1932) allowed a deduction to an individual taxpayer for the expenses of a
successful defense of a criminal tax charge against a corporation, the expense having been assumed by the individual taxpayer responsible for the

corporation's tax returns in order to protect his business reputation.

17. See Richard F. Smith, 31 T.C. 1 (1958) (conviction of two of five criminal tax charges). The court refused to apportion the legal expenses and
allow a deduction for the amount attributable to the three successful de-

fenses.
18. INT.

REV. CODE OF 1954 § 212: "In the case of an individual, there shall
be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year ... (3) in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax."
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successfully defending the criminal charge as a business expense on
the ground that the source of the income was from the taxpayer's
business. The Commissioner's appeal was based on the theory that
the acts charged as criminal must be business acts for their defense
to be deductible as a necessary and ordinary business expense, and
that the acts involved were not so found. The court allowed the
deduction "on more broad grounds than those of the Tax Court."'19 A
distinction was made between litigation expenses in tax and non-tax
cases, the court finding that in both civil and criminal non-tax cases
there must be a proximate relationship of the particular lawsuit to
the business or profit-seeking activity of the taxpayer in order to
be deductible. The court stated that the element of "proximate
cause" is of less importance in tax litigation. It found the new
provision of the 1954 Code to be an expansion of a regulation promulgated under the 1939 Code pertaining to income tax litigation expenses.20 The court said that deductions are granted freely for
legal expenses in contesting civil tax suits; that there is no essential
difference between legal expenses in civil and criminal tax cases;
that "both instances basically involve the 'determination' of tax
liability;" and that therefore "reasonable legal expenses incident
to the determination of income tax liability-whether the litigation
be civil or criminal-are deductible expenses under section 23, subject to proper limitations of 'public policy' in unsuccessful criminal
defenses."'1 In finding the expense deductible as being for "determination of income tax liability" the court made an analogy between
the regulation under the 1939 Code22 and section 212 (3) of the 1954
Code. 23 This decision is apparently the first one by an appellate
court having pertinence to the construction of that provision of the
1954 Code. 24
No case has been found, nor is there any authority under the
1939 Code, granting a deduction for legal expenses except where
they can be categorized under section 23 as ordinary and necessary
expenses of a trade or business or other profit-seeking activity of
19. 278 F.2d at 558.

20. "Expenses paid or incurred by an individual in the determination of
liability for taxes upon his income are deductible." Treas. Reg. 111, §
29.23(a)-15 (1943), as amended, T.D. 5513, 1946-1 Cum. BULL. 61.
21. 278 F.2d at 560.
22. See note 20 supra.
23. See note 18 supra.
24. Bonnyman v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. Tenn. 1957) is
the only district court case found decided under § 212 (3). Expenses of
settlement of a gift tax liability were allowed as a deduction. The Commissioner had disallowed the deduction on the authority of cases decided under
§ 23 of the 1939 Code. The court pointed out that the expense would not
have been allowed under the 1939 Code, and that § 212 (1) and (2) was

the same as § 23 of the 1939 Code, but that § 212 (3) provided a new area
of deductions for expenses incurred in determining tax liability.
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the taxpayer. Section 212 (3) of the 1954 Code does more than
merely extend to all kinds of taxes the deductibility which was
already being allowed for the determination of income taxes. The
1954 Code literally grants the deduction regardless of whether the
expense is related to the profit-seeking activity of the taxpayer. In
departing from the ground of the Tax Court's ruling, the court has
apparently departed from authority. The decision can be justified
under the 1939 Code only if the court's novel assumption-that
"determination of tax liability" includes liability for criminal sanctions for tax evasion-is valid. If it is valid, and expenses of determining criminal tax "liability" are deductible under the regulation
of the 1939 Code, then it follows that such expenses must be deductible under the analogous wording of section 212 (3) of the 1954 Code.
Although the court qualified the opinion with "subject to proper
limitations of 'public policy' in unsuccessful criminal defenses," it
is not entirely clear that these limitations would be the same limitations that have been applied in the past. In the only case in which
the Supreme Court has discussed the public policy limitation on
deduction of litigation expenses,25 there was an implication that the
expense might be disallowed if allowing it would frustrate sharply
defined national or state policies, but this interpretation is not as
unequivocal as it has been construed by the lower courts. 26 No court
has suggested what will be done in the event there should be conflicting public policies. To whatever extent section 212 (3) may allow
a deduction for expenses of criminal tax litigation, and to whatever
extent the sixth amendment of the Constitution may be pertinent,27
there would now be some sharply defined national policy in favor
of permitting a deduction for litigation expenses of a criminal tax
case, whether successful or unsuccessful. It seems a reasonable prediction that this case will be cited in the future as basis for claiming
a deduction for expenses of defending an unsuccessful criminal tax
case. Although the attempt might prove to be futile from the
standpoint of the intrepid taxpayer who should make it, it should
be beneficial to the lower courts which are called upon to exercise
discretion in this matter if it resulted in an authoritative analysis
of the public policy considerations to be applied in allowing or disallowing deductions of otherwise deductible expenses. An oppositive
25. Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
26. See Brookes, Litigation Expenses and the Income Tax, 12 TAx L. REv.
241 (1956) for the suggestion that Heininger would not have to be overruled if the Supreme Court should determine that litigation expenses of
unsuccessful criminal defenses should be allowed, and a comprehensive
analysis of deductibility of litigation expenses in general.
27. It would be difficult to meet the argument that a public policy favoring
assistance of counsel for an accused in a criminal action does not carry the
implication that it should not be at his personal expense.
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interpretation of the holding in this case could be based upon the
court's conclusion that there is no essential difference between legal
expenses arising in civil and criminal tax cases. The Commissioner
might conceivably argue that if there is no essential difference, and
if public policy denies a deduction in the unsuccessful criminal tax
case, it should also deny a deduction of unsuccessful civil tax case
expenses. Although this interpretation would be considerably weaker
than the other, the Commissioner has not disdained to shoot arrows
when he had no stronger ammunition. Whatever interpretation will
be placed on the case, it cannot be expected to pass into limbo merely
because it was decided under the 1939 Code.

